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CLASH OF THE INTEGRATIONISTS: THE MISMATCH OF CIVIL 
RIGHTS IMPERATIVES IN SUPPORTIVE HOUSING FOR PEOPLE 
WITH DISABILITIES 
HENRY KORMAN* 
A northeastern state embarked on an ambitious planning effort to develop 
supportive housing opportunities for homeless people with serious mental 
illnesses in subsidized, scattered site, community-based apartments as an 
alternative to hospitalization and placement in halfway houses.  The initiative 
brought together state mental health officials, state housing agencies, non-
profit developers, homeless service providers, and civil rights advocates.  The 
plan that emerged from the group would have combined state and federal 
housing funds to build housing for homeless people with mental illnesses, 
where services would be available on a voluntary basis to individual 
participants.  The effort stalled and then stopped altogether when the U.S. 
Department of Housing and Urban Development enforced a rule that prohibits 
use of federal housing funds in developments that serve people with a single 
type of diagnosis. 
I.  INTRODUCTION 
There exists a tension within the idea of disability rights.  It coalesces 
around the questions of whether, when, and how an individual’s characteristics 
as a person with disabilities should be factors in access to employment, 
housing, and public services.  There is a day-to-day reality to these questions in 
any number of contexts.  This article focuses on one: equal access to integrated 
housing opportunities for people with significant disabilities, including 
homeless people with disabilities, who choose to receive supportive services in 
community-based settings.  In that context, there is a failure of two systems to 
function together.  Supportive services are generally delivered through systems 
that make services available to people with disabilities based on their category 
of disability.  Mainstream federal housing programs permit admissions and 
selection preferences under a broad, all-inclusive definition of disability, but 
 
* Henry Korman is a sole practitioner from Boston, MA, specializing in affordable housing 
development and civil rights.  The author gratefully acknowledges the help of the following 
friends and colleagues whose contributions of time and insight improved this article in countless 
ways: Michael Allen, Nestor Davidson, Steven Day, Robert Fleischner, Ann O’Hara, Daniel 
Rosen and Roberta Rubin. 
SAINT LOUIS UNIVERISTY SCHOOL OF LAW 
4 SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY PUBLIC LAW REVIEW [Vol. 26:3 
they tend to prohibit programs that serve categories of people with disabilities.  
The clash in these two approaches often thwarts attempts to create integrated, 
community-based housing opportunities for meeting the needs of people with 
disabilities. 
Advances in disability rights over the last four decades mark a far-reaching 
“paradigm shift” in how and where people with disabilities receive housing 
and supportive services.1  Old models hid people with mental illnesses, people 
with physical disabilities, and people with mental retardation and other 
developmental disabilities in state psychiatric hospitals, nursing homes, state 
schools, and intermediate care facilities for the mentally retarded (ICF/MR).  
These places were often squalid, and by definition they were segregated and 
isolated from community life.  The delivery of services in such settings was 
controlled by single purpose agencies with the narrow mission of serving 
people with a single type of disability. 
Beginning in the 1970s, civil rights lawsuits improved living conditions, 
and in some cases succeeded in closing the worst of these places.  When 
institutional care was replaced, it was with a “continuum of facilities”2 
including community residences, halfway houses, and other community-based 
facilities often characterized “as ‘mini-institutions,’ ‘candy-coated hospitals,’ 
and ‘living room jails.’”3  The continuum includes homeless shelters and 
transitional housing for homeless people who “tend to have disabling health 
and behavioral health problems.”4  In the continuum model, housing and 
services are “bundled” and delivered in a range of settings from most 
restrictive to least restrictive based on the extent and nature of an individual’s 
disability.  “To move from a more restrictive setting to a less restrictive 
 
 1. Michael Allen, Waking Rip Van Winkle: Why Developments in the Last Twenty Years 
Should Teach the Mental Health System Not to Use Housing as a Tool of Coercion, 21 BEHAV. 
SCI. & L. 503, 504, 521 (2003); Paul J. Carling, Housing and Supports for Persons with Mental 
Illness: Emerging Approaches to Research and Practice, 44 HOSP. & COMMUNITY PSYCHIATRY 
439, 442 (1993) [hereinafter Carling, Housing and Supports for Persons with Mental Illness]. 
 2. ANN O’HARA & STEVEN DAY, CENTER FOR HEALTH CARE STRATEGIES, INC., 
OLMSTEAD AND SUPPORTIVE HOUSING: A VISION FOR THE FUTURE 7 (2001), available at 
http://www.chcs.org/usr_doc/supportive_housing.pdf (last visited Mar. 3, 2007). 
 3. John V. Jacobi, Federal Power, Segregation and Mental Disability, 39 HOUS. L. REV. 
1231, 1252 (2003) (citations omitted). 
 4. SUBSTANCE ABUSE & MENTAL HEALTH SERVS. ADMIN. CTR. FOR MENTAL HEALTH 
SERVS., U.S. DEP’T OF HEALTH & HUMAN SERVICES, BLUEPRINT FOR CHANGE: ENDING 
CHRONIC HOMELESSNESS FOR PERSONS WITH SERIOUS MENTAL ILLNESS AND/OR CO-
OCCURRING SUBSTANCE ABUSE DISORDERS 3 (2003), available at http://download.ncadi. 
samhsa.gov/ken/pdf/SMA04-3870/SMA04-3870.pdf [hereinafter HHS, BLUEPRINT FOR 
CHANGE]; see also Ronnie Michelle Greenwood et al., Decreasing Psychiatric Symptoms by 
Increasing Choice in Services for Adults with Histories of Homelessness, 36 AM. J. COMMUNITY 
PSYCHOLOGY 223, 224 (2005) (describing “Continuum of Care” in provision of homeless 
services funded by U.S. Department of Housing and Urban Development). 
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setting. . .an individual must acquire more independent living skills and need 
fewer services.”5  Like large institutions, continuum-type facilities persist.  
And like those large institutions, housing and services are typically delivered 
through single purpose agencies and non-profit organizations that serve limited 
categories of people with disabilities. 
In the slow evolution of the new paradigm over the last decade, the most 
recent model for provision of housing and services is “permanent supportive 
housing.”  There is no single definition of supportive housing.  Indeed, some of 
the statutory housing programs that fund supportive housing define it to 
include continuum-type facilities.6  For purposes of this discussion, the 
concept of supportive housing is used more precisely to describe an advance 
over institutional and quasi-institutional settings.  “Common principles of 
supportive housing include” settings where housing is permanent, and not 
transitional.7  Housing “must be ‘unbundled’ from supportive services and not 
made contingent on receipt of services.  However, supportive services must be 
made available. . .if needed and desired.  Supportive services must be flexible 
and individualized, rather than defined by a ‘program.’”8  Even with these 
shared principles, the “lack of a common definition . . . typifies segmented 
approaches that evolved as supported housing was developed for disparate 
groups.” 9  In other words, supportive housing tends to serve categories of 
people with disabilities, just like institutions and continuum facilities. 
The supportive housing model places a high premium on permanent 
housing.  It recognizes that many people with disabilities are extremely poor.10  
Consequently, it is reliant on mainstream federal housing programs “to expand 
affordable housing opportunities for low-income people or people with 
 
 5. O’HARA & DAY, supra note 2; see also Greenwood et al., supra note 4. 
 6. Compare, e.g., 42 U.S.C. § 8013(k)(1), (4) (2006) (Section 811 program of supportive 
housing for people with disabilities may include group homes and independent living facilities); 
42 U.S.C. § 11384 (2006) (Supportive Housing Program for homeless people may include 
transitional housing, permanent housing, housing that meets the immediate or long term needs of 
homeless people, and single room occupancy housing); 42 U.S.C. § 12703(5) (2006) (supportive 
housing constructed with funds from HOME Investment Partnership program “combines 
structural features and services needed to enable persons with special needs to live with dignity 
and independence”); 71 Fed. Reg. 38882, 38883 (Jul. 10, 2006) (for purpose of disposition of 
surplus federal housing to assist homeless people, “permanent supportive housing means long-
term, affordable, community-based housing that is linked to appropriate supportive health and 
social services . . . that enable homeless individuals and homeless families with disabilities to 
maintain housing”). 
 7. O’HARA & DAY, supra note 2, at 8. 
 8. Id. 
 9. Id. 
 10. Id. 
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disabilities, including those who are homeless.”11  It is at this place where 
housing programs and supportive services programs intersect that there is a 
conflict within the new paradigm. 
The source of this conflict is in a clash of integrationist ideals.  State and 
federal providers of supportive services are motivated by the command of the 
Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA) as interpreted by the Supreme Court in 
Olmstead v. L.C.12  States must maintain “a comprehensive, effectively 
working plan for” assuring that people with disabilities are offered the 
opportunity to live outside of institutions in the most appropriate “integrated 
setting” by means of “a waiting list that move[s] at a reasonable pace not 
controlled by the State’s endeavors to keep its institutions fully 
populated . . . .”13  Because Olmstead requires the deinstitutionalization of 
people isolated by diagnosis in places administered by agencies identified by 
diagnosis, its implementation is by necessity focused on category of disability.  
Restrictions in housing programs that prohibit preferences based on category 
of disability are also integrationist.  Those limitations place a premium on 
equal treatment and equality of opportunity, and interpret preferences based on 
diagnosis as a form of exclusion and segregation.  In the housing context, the 
integrationist ideal is one in which protected characteristics should not be a 
factor in the distribution of benefits and equality of opportunity is a function of 
choice in a market that ought to disregard disability. 
Experience teaches that this clash of integrationist ideals can sometimes 
interfere with efforts to develop supportive housing for people with disabilities.  
Use of Project-Based Section 8 Housing Choice Vouchers to create supportive 
housing is the most recent example of such problems.  Until rule changes were 
published in 2005, the Project-Based Voucher program was subject to general 
provisions that forbade any form of preferential admission based on category 
of disability.14  Regulatory waivers by the U.S. Department of Housing and 
Urban Development (HUD) were necessary to construct Project-Based 
Voucher housing targeted at individuals receiving supportive services on a 
categorical basis.  The process was lengthy, the outcome uncertain.  The 
consequent delays and denials added significantly to project cost and 
undermined project feasibility.15 
 
 11. HHS, BLUEPRINT FOR CHANGE, supra note 4, at 52; see also O’HARA & DAY, supra 
note 2, at 10 (“people with significant disabilities- like other extremely low income groups- 
should have more access to government housing programs to make housing truly affordable. . .”). 
 12. 527 U.S. 581 (1999). 
 13. Id. at 584, 585. 
 14. 24 C.F.R. § 982.207(b)(1) (2005) made applicable to Project Based Vouchers by 24 
C.F.R. § 983.1(b)(1) (2005). 
 15. CONSORTIUM FOR CITIZENS WITH DISABILITIES AND TECHNICAL ASSISTANCE 
COLLABORATIVE, OPENING DOORS, THE SECTION 8 PROJECT-BASED VOUCHER PROGRAM: 
CREATING NEW HOUSING OPPORTUNITIES FOR PEOPLE WITH DISABILITIES 8 (2006).  For 
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The conflict in civil rights principles raises several questions: What is it 
about the status of people with disabilities that makes supportive housing such 
a crucial resource?  Why is it that category of disability is so central to the 
delivery of supportive services?  What characteristics of housing programs 
cause the mismatch in principles?  What civil rights considerations motivate 
the apparently different conceptions of the integrationist ideal?  Is it possible to 
close the gap in thinking in order to promote access to housing opportunity for 
people with disabilities in a manner that honors an integrationist ideal?  Is there 
evidence of a “newer paradigm” of supportive housing that suggests a trend 
towards the ideal? 
The answers to these questions lie in a better understanding of the 
overarching civil rights principles that are common to systems of supportive 
services and affordable housing programs.  The concept of supportive housing 
originated among people with disabilities, clinicians, and civil rights advocates 
concerned with individual dignity, personal choice, and autonomy.  A true 
supportive housing model honors these themes.  From this vantage, the 
apparent integrationist contradiction between programs that provide services 
and programs that provide housing is a false conflict.  If in practical design and 
implementation, supportive housing programs adhere to principles of 
integration, it should not matter if the programs serve all people with 
disabilities or just some targeted group based on category of disability. 
II.  THE STATUS OF PEOPLE WITH DISABILITIES AND THE NEED FOR 
SUPPORTIVE SERVICES AND AFFORDABLE HOUSING 
The most important factor affecting the status of people with disabilities is 
disability itself.  Although it is often expressed in medical or functional terms, 
“disability” is a social construct and therefore is assigned different meanings in 
different contexts.16  The 2000 United States Census uses a variety of 
definitions of disability, including sensory disability, physical disability, 
mental disability, self-care disability, “going-outside-the-home disability,” and 
employment disability.17  The ADA and other civil rights laws protecting 
people with disabilities like the Fair Housing Act (also known as Title VIII) 
 
examples of approved waivers see 69 Fed. Reg. 47249, 47279 to 47283 (Aug. 4, 2004) (selection 
preferences for people with chronic persistent mental illness, people with developmental 
disabilities, and people with AIDS); 69 Fed. Reg. 62992, 63010 (Oct. 28, 2004) (homeless people 
with significant disabilities that interfere with their ability to find and maintain housing, including 
people with chronic persistent mental illness); 69 Fed. Reg. 64440, 64445 (Nov. 4, 2004); and 70 
Fed. Reg. 2218, 2240 (Jan. 12, 2005) (people with HIV/AIDS). 
 16. Mark C. Weber, Disability and the Law of Welfare: A Post-Integrationist Examination, 
200 U. ILL. L. REV. 889, 895 (2000). 
 17. U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, CENSUS 2000 SPECIAL REPORTS, DISABILITY AND AMERICAN 
FAMILIES: 2000 2 (2005) [hereinafter U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, DISABILITY AND AMERICAN 
FAMILIES]. 
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and Section 504 of the 1973 Rehabilitation Act (Section 504) define 
“disability” to include people with medical conditions that impair activities of 
daily living, people with a history of impairments who are not currently people 
with disabilities, and individuals perceived by others to be people with 
disabilities.18  Laws that distribute public benefits based on disability, like 
supportive services and housing, typically define the qualifying features of 
disability only by the existence of a serious or significant impairment.19 The 
range of definitions is a reflection of the social goal of the program.20 
Any civil rights discussion about disability must recognize that disability is 
an individual experience.  There are hundreds of conditions that affect different 
people in vastly different ways.  The people protected by the outcome of 
Olmstead are people in institutions or at risk of institutionalization.21  
Supportive housing generally is targeted at people with serious and persistent 
 
 18. The ADA, Title VIII and Section 504 definitions of “disability” are virtually identical.  
For the ADA’s definition see 42 U.S.C. § 12102(h) (2006). The Section 504 definition of 
disability is in 29 U.S.C. § 705(20)(B), § 794(a) (2006). The Title VIII definition of disability is 
codified at 42 U.S.C. § 3602(h) (2006).  Title VIII actually uses the term “handicap person” to 
describe the class of people with disabilities protected by fair housing laws.  Id.  The terminology 
used here follows the ADA convention, recognizing that many people with disabilities find the 
term “handicap” objectionable because, like racial slurs, it is a word “overlaid with stereotypes, 
patronizing attitudes and other emotional connotations.”  56 Fed. Reg. 35693, 35698 (Jul. 26, 
1991) (to be codified at 28 C.F.R. § 36). 
 19. For example, an individual qualifies as a person with disabilities for federally funded 
medical assistance (Medicaid) and needs-based Supplemental Security Income (SSI) cash 
disability benefits if he or she is “unable to engage in any substantial gainful activity by reason of 
any medically determinable physical or mental impairment which can be expected to result in 
death or which has lasted. . .for a continuous period of. . .twelve months. . .”  42 U.S.C. § 
1382c(a)(3)(A) (2006) (SSI benefits); 42 U.S.C. § 1396d(a)(v) (2006) (Medicaid available to 
persons with disabilities within the meaning of the SSI statute).  Federal housing programs 
generally rely on a definition of disability under which a person qualifies if the individual has a 
disability meeting Social Security disability standards, has developmental disabilities, or has “a 
physical, mental or emotional impairment which (I) is expected to be of long-continued and 
indefinite duration, (II) substantially impedes his or her ability to live independently, and (III) is 
of such a nature that such ability could be improved by more suitable housing conditions.”  42 
U.S.C. § 1437a(b)(3)(E) (2006).  Programs targeted at people experiencing chronic homelessness 
serve people “with a disabling condition,” defined as “a diagnosable substance abuse disorder, 
serious mental illness, developmental disability, or chronic physical illness or disability, including 
the co-occurrence of two or more of these conditions.” 24 C.F.R. § 91.5 (2006).  For a more 
complete discussion of the variety of definitions at work in different social benefits programs see 
Robert Silverstein, Emerging Disability Policy Framework: A Guidepost for Analyzing Public 
Policy, 85 IOWA L. REV. 1691, 1715 (2000). 
 20. See supra note 19. 
 21. See Olmstead v. L.C., 527 U.S. 581, 593 (1999) (plaintiffs are people confined to 
psychiatric units); Makin ex rel. Russell v. Hawaii, 114 F. Supp. 2d 1017, 1033-1034 (D. Haw. 
1999) (“most integrated setting” mandate of ADA protects people living at home at risk of 
institutionalization). 
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disabilities who desire support with activities of daily living, or need assistance 
in order to overcome barriers to getting into and staying in housing. 
Not all people with disabilities need or want to live in supportive settings.  
It is therefore important to bear in mind that the individuals who desire or 
qualify for supportive housing represent a subset of all people with disabilities.  
Those individuals who do desire supportive housing include frail elders, 
chronically homeless people, and people with significant disabilities.  These 
are people with “specific functional limitations and long-term difficulty with 
functional or daily living activities.”22  They are often individuals who need 
“long-term supports and services in order to live as independently as 
possible.”23  People with significant physical disabilities require the removal of 
architectural barriers, and they may need assistive technology and adaptive 
equipment.24  More than seven million people need personal care assistance 
with activities of daily living such as eating, getting in and out of bed or a 
chair, bathing, dressing or toileting.25  Some people with serious mental 
illnesses need periodic assistance with money management, medication 
management, vocational support and skills training, socialization, housing 
search, and crisis support, especially to prevent re-hospitalization.26  People 
with developmental disabilities such as mental retardation may require similar 
 
 22. U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, DISABILITY AND AMERICAN FAMILIES, supra note 17, at 3.  “The 
term ‘functional limitations’ generally refers to people who have difficulty performing one of 
more functional activities, such as seeing, hearing, speaking, lifting, using stairs, or walking.”  Id. 
at 3 n.6. 
 23. O’HARA & DAY, supra note 2, at 7. 
 24. See U.S. DEP’T OF HEALTH AND HUMAN SERVS., UNDERSTANDING MEDICAID HOME 
AND COMMUNITY SERVICES: A PRIMER 56 (2000), available at http://aspe.hhs.gov/daltcp/ 
reports/primer.pdf (last visited Mar. 2, 2007) (“individuals with physical impairments benefit 
from home and vehicle modifications”) [hereinafter HHS, UNDERSTANDING MEDICAID HOME 
AND COMMUNITY SERVICES]; see also STEVEN LUTZKY, LISA MARIA B. ALECIH, JENNIFER 
DUFFY & CHRISTINA NEILL, THE LEWIN GROUP, REVIEW OF THE MEDICAID 1915(C) HOME AND 
COMMUNITY-BASED SERVICES WAIVER PROGRAM LITERATURE AND PROGRAM DATA: FINAL 
REPORT 15-16 (2000),  available at http://www.lewin.com/Lewin_Publications/Medicaid_and_S-
CHIP/Publication-4.htm (last visited Mar. 2, 2007) (describing assistive technology and adaptive 
equipment). 
 25. Jae Kennedy & Mitchell P. LaPlante, Disabilities Statistics Rehabilitation Research and 
Training Center, Institute for Health & Aging, in A PROFILE OF ADULTS NEEDING ASSISTANCE 
WITH ACTIVITIES OF DAILY LIVING, 1991-1992 5 (1997); see also Andrew I. Batavia, A Right to 
Personal Assistance Services: “Most Integrated Setting Appropriate” Requirements and the 
Independent Living Model of Long-Term Care, 27 AM. J. L. & MED. 17 (2001) (“Sixteen percent 
of people over age sixty-five require assistance with their activities of daily living . . . [a]mong 
the working-age population (ages 18-64), the personal assistance rate rose by 35% during the 
1980s to 2.7 % in 1993”) (citations omitted). 
 26. Jessica Jonikas & Judith Cook, Research in Psychosocial Rehabilitation, in BEST 
PRACTICES IN PSYCHOSOCIAL REHABILITATION 63-64 (Ruth Hughes and Diane Weinstein, eds., 
International Association of Psychosocial Rehabilitation Services 2000); Carling, supra note 1, at 
443-444. 
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services, and may also benefit from case management and habilitation services 
that are “designed to assist individuals in acquiring, retaining and improving 
the self-help, socialization, and adaptive skills necessary to reside successfully 
in home and community based settings . . . .”27 
People with disabilities are also significantly and disproportionately poor 
compared to their counterparts without disabilities.  Of the 49.7 million 
individuals with disabilities in the United States, 8.7 million live in poverty.28  
That poverty rate of 17.6 % is two-thirds higher than the poverty rate for 
people without disabilities, 10.6 %.29  While nearly eighty percent of 
individuals age sixteen to sixty-four are working, only sixty percent of working 
age people with disabilities are employed.30  The poverty rate for individuals 
with disabilities of working age is double that of people without 
disabilities.31Sixty-one percent of families with a household member with 
disabilities receive Social Security benefits, needs-based Supplemental 
Security Income (SSI), or public assistance, compared to 17.8 % of families 
where there is no person with a disability.32  The median income of families 
reporting full time earnings where the family includes a member with 
disabilities is nearly sixteen percent less than other families.33 
Housing resources that serve all low-income people are scarce, and that 
scarcity is particularly burdensome for people with disabilities.34  Each year 
HUD prepares a congressional report estimating the number of U.S. 
households with “worst case housing needs.”35  These families are renter 
 
 27. LUTZKY ET AL., supra note 24. 
 28. U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, CENSUS 2000 BRIEFS, DISABILITY STATUS: 2000 2, tbl.1 
(numbers of people with disabilities), 10 (employment and poverty) (2003). 
 29. Id. at 10. 
 30. Id. 
 31. Id. at 2, tbl.1, 10. 
 32. U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, DISABILITY AND AMERICAN FAMILIES, supra note 17, at 6. 
 33. Id. at 8.  Data on families excludes households that include people “who only reported 
difficulty in working;” that is, people who report only a work disability.  Id. at 3.  For the 
conditions of poverty faced by chronically homeless people see HHS, BLUEPRINT FOR CHANGE, 
supra note 4, at 23. 
 34. See HUD, OFFICE OF POLICY DEVELOPMENT AND RESEARCH, AFFORDABLE HOUSING 
NEEDS: A REPORT TO CONGRESS ON THE SIGNIFICANT NEED FOR HOUSING 41 (2005) 
[hereinafter HUD, AFFORDABLE HOUSING NEEDS] (“There are only 78.2 affordable units for 
every 100 extremely-low-income households.  The ratio of available units is about half as great, 
at 44 units per 100 households, and even among these available units, only three-fourths are 
physically adequate.”).  For purposes of the report, “affordable” units include subsidized and 
other assisted housing, and unassisted units in the private market priced at affordable levels.  Id. 
at 40.  The lesser availability of affordable units results from the fact that many affordable units 
are occupied by households with higher incomes.  See HUD, TRENDS IN WORST CASE NEEDS 
FOR HOUSING, 1978-1999: A REPORT TO CONGRESS ON WORST CASE HOUSING NEEDS 52 
(2003). 
 35. See HUD, AFFORDABLE HOUSING NEEDS, supra note 34. 
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households without rental assistance or other housing subsidies, “very low 
incomes (below 50% of area median income- AMI) who pay more than half of 
their income for housing or live in severely substandard housing” or both.36  
HUD measures the rate of worst case housing need among very low-income 
people with disabilities at 36.4%.37  The agency acknowledges that the annual 
worst case needs study significantly undercounts both the total number of very 
low-income renter households with disabilities, and the number of those 
disabled families with worst case housing needs.38  Even with the low 
estimates, the rate of need among disabled households is higher than any other 
group whose needs are measured by the report, including families with 
children and elderly families.39  When a group of disability rights advocates 
examined HUD data in 1996, they identified 1.7 million non-elderly 
households including people with disabilities with worst case needs, a number 
ten times the amount identified by HUD for the same time period.40 
For the 4.1 million people with disabilities who rely on needs-based SSI 
payments, the measure of housing need is particularly troubling.41  In twenty 
states, the fair market rent standard used by HUD to measure the cost of a 
modest one bedroom apartment for purposes of the Section 8 Housing Choice 
Voucher program exceeds the entire amount of an individual monthly SSI 
payment.42  There is no state in the nation where the fair market rent is less 
than seventy one percent of monthly SSI benefits.43 
 
 36. Id. at 1. 
 37. Id. at 20. 
 38. Id. at 78-79.   
 39. Id. at 20.  The worst case rate among elderly families is 34.5% and among families with 
children it is 29%.  Id. at 19. 
 40. CONSORTIUM FOR CITIZENS WITH DISABILITIES AND TECHNICAL ASSISTANCE 
COLLABORATIVE, OPENING DOORS: RECOMMENDATIONS FOR A FEDERAL POLICY TO ADDRESS 
THE HOUSING NEEDS OF PEOPLE WITH DISABILITIES 11 (1996).  Other government studies 
suggest that HUD seriously underestimates the numbers of very low-income non-elders with 
disabilities and consequently, the number of families including people with disabilities with worst 
case housing needs.  Compare GENERAL ACCOUNTING OFFICE, PUBLIC HOUSING: IMPACT OF 
DESIGNATED PUBLIC HOUSING ON PERSONS WITH DISABILITIES 35, app. I, tbl.I.1 (1998) (2.1 
million very low-income renter households including a person with disabilities), with HUD, 
AFFORDABLE HOUSING NEEDS, supra note 34, at 27 (“1.4 million very-low-income renter 
households have members with disabilities”). 
 41. CONSORTIUM FOR CITIZENS WITH DISABILITIES HOUSING TASK FORCE AND TECHNICAL 
ASSISTANCE COLLABORATIVE, PRICED OUT IN 2004: THE HOUSING CRISIS FOR PEOPLE WITH 
DISABILITIES (2005). 
 42. Id. 
 43. Id.  The HUD fair market rent, or FMR, is generally represented by the fortieth 
percentile rent based on “housing market-wide estimates of rents that provide opportunities to 
rent standard quality housing.”  24 C.F.R. § 888.113(a) (2006).  Thus, it is a rent level that is 
lower than even the median rent for a particular market area. 
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The confluence of poverty, high rent burdens, poor housing conditions, the 
decrease in the numbers of people living in institutions, and the need for 
supports that foster independent living lead to an unavoidable result.  To 
accomplish the goal of integration that is the mandate of Olmstead, many 
people with disabilities require “publicly funded social programs which are 
necessary to enable transition from the segregated world of institutions and to 
facilitate full participation in civil life.”44 
III.  SUPPORTIVE SERVICES AND THE IMPERATIVE TO DEINSTITUTIONALIZE 
“Most people who require long-term care services receive their personal 
care under the ‘informal support model,’ in which uncompensated services are 
provided by family members and friends.”45  However, it is also true that after 
out-of-pocket personal expenditures, the largest source of funds for long-term 
care and community-based supportive services is the Medical Assistance or 
Medicaid program.46 
Medicaid is a program where costs are shared roughly half and half 
between the states and the federal government.  Each state adopts a Medicaid 
“state plan” that includes certain federally mandated services, plus additional 
optional services.47  While some mandated services support independent living 
for people with disabilities, such as home health care, many of the services that 
are linked to supportive housing are optional, available only at the discretion of 
the participating state.48 
Medicaid is hampered by an “institutional bias.”49  Frail elders and people 
with significant physical disabilities historically received and continue to 
receive Medicaid-funded care in nursing homes and rehabilitation facilities.  
Medicaid also pays for the costs of confining people with developmental 
disabilities to large institutions and ICF/MR.  “Medicaid does not cover 
institutional costs for non-elderly adults with mental illness.”50  This 
circumstance dates to the inception of Medicaid, when Congress “feared that 
 
 44. Jacobi, supra note 3, at 1281. 
 45. Batavia, supra note 25, at 17. 
 46. Id. at 18 (citing Robyn I. Stone, Long-term Care for the Elderly with Disabilities: 
Current Policy, Emerging Trends, and Implications for the Twenty-First Century, MILBANK 
MEM. FUND 16, 13 (2000)). 
 47. Sara Rosenbaum, Joel Teitelbaum, & Alexandra Stewart, Olmstead v. L.C.: Implications 
for Medicaid and Other Publicly Funded Health Services, 12 HEALTH MATRIX: J.L. & MED. 93, 
124-31 (2002). 
 48. See, e.g., HHS, UNDERSTANDING MEDICAID HOME AND COMMUNITY SERVICES, supra 
note 24, at 44 (describing home health services). 
 49. NAT’L COUNCIL ON DISABILITY, OLMSTEAD: RECLAIMING INSTITUTIONALIZED LIVES 
(Abridged Version) 34 (2003), available at http://www.ncd.gov/newsroom/publications/2003/ 
pdf/reclaimabridged.pdf (last visited Mar. 2, 2007); see also LUTZKY ET AL., supra note 24, at 1. 
 50. LUTZKY ET AL., supra note 24, at 6. 
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the costs of covering” the thousands of individuals housed in state hospitals 
would overwhelm the program.51  Amendments to the Medicaid statute now 
offer states “the option of Medicaid reimbursement for individuals under the 
age of twenty-two and over the age of sixty-four residing in psychiatric 
hospitals.”52  State funds continue to pay most of the costs of operating large 
state psychiatric institutions for non-elderly adults with mental illnesses. 
The change to the continuum model of care did not end Medicaid’s bias in 
favor of institutions.  A “variety of models,” including “halfway 
houses. . .family foster care, boarding homes. . .group residences,” short term 
“apartments reserved for crisis intervention. . .[s]helters for homeless persons 
and transitional or permanent ‘housing for the homeless’ have become the 
latest in a series of quasi-institutional solutions to housing and support 
needs.”53  Both the institutional and the quasi-institutional models persist.  
Nearly a million people with disabilities remain in ICF/MR, psychiatric 
institutions, and board and care facilities.54  Another 1.3 million people live in 
nursing homes, and of these, 10.9 % are under the age of sixty-five.55  In many 
states nursing homes are the alternative to psychiatric hospitals for states 
hoping to shift to the Medicaid program the cost of institutionalizing non-
elderly adults with mental illnesses.  Even though federal rules require 
independent screening of admittees to avoid the practice, estimates are that as 
many as twenty percent of the individuals between the ages of twenty-two and 
sixty- four residing in nursing homes are people with a primary or secondary 
diagnosis of mental illness.56 
As much as any one motivating factor, it was civil rights claims asserted 
by people with disabilities during the 1970s that began the paradigm shift to 
community-based services: 
These cases consistently concluded that civil rights of individuals with [mental 
retardation and developmental disabilities] in state institutions were being 
violated and that these individuals were being forced to live in inhumane 
 
 51. SUBSTANCE ABUSE AND MENTAL HEALTH SERVS. ADMIN., U.S. DEP’T OF HEALTH AND 
HUMAN SERVS., SCREENING FOR MENTAL ILLNESS IN NURSING FACILITY APPLICANTS: 
UNDERSTANDING FEDERAL REQUIREMENTS 5, n.4 (2002) [hereinafter SCREENING FOR MENTAL 
ILLNESS IN NURSING FACILITY APPLICANTS], available at http://download.ncadi.samhsa.gov/ken/ 
pdf/SMA01-3543/CMHS2a.pdf (last visited Mar. 2, 2007). 
 52. Id. at 5, n.4. 
 53. Carling, Housing and Supports for Persons with Mental Illness, supra note 1, at 441. 
 54. NAT’L COUNCIL ON DISABILITY, supra note 49, at 11-18. 
 55. Id. 
 56. OFFICE OF THE INSPECTOR GENERAL, U.S. DEP’T OF HEALTH AND HUMAN SERVS., 
YOUNGER NURSING FACILITY RESIDENTS WITH MENTAL ILLNESS: AN UNIDENTIFIED 
POPULATION 9-10 (2001), available at http://oig.hhs.gov/oei/reports/oei-05-99-00700.pdf (last 
visited Mar. 2, 2007). For a detailed discussion of the screening requirements, see generally 
SCREENING FOR MENTAL ILLNESS IN NURSING FACILITY APPLICANTS, supra note 51. 
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conditions where physical, emotional, and sexual abuse, and physical and 
medical neglect were the common experience.57 
Some litigation involved claims for deinstitutionalization and community-
based living opportunities, while other court decisions established a right to 
treatment, education and training, freedom from unjustified physical restraint, 
freedom from abuse and neglect, freedom from indefinite involuntary 
confinement, and the opportunity for a fair procedure to determine the need for 
confinement.  Based on Fourteenth Amendment guarantees of equal protection, 
liberty, and due process, as well as Section 504 and similar laws, the cases 
anticipated the ADA-based claim in Olmstead.58  While the courts endorsed 
the principle that people with disabilities were entitled to receive services in a 
“least restrictive alternative,” they also held that Section 504 does not prohibit 
institutionalization.59  The changes sparked by this litigation led to an indirect, 
but crucial result.  “The reforms of institutional care became a factor in further 
deinstitutionalization because they increased institutional care costs (e.g. 
requiring more staff, etc.).”60  Due to the high costs of institutional care, 
“combined with criticism of Medicaid’s institutional bias, states and the 
Federal government began to look for ways to provide long-term care services 
in less restrictive, more cost-effective ways.”61 
The Medicaid-funded system of community based services that emerged 
from this background retains fundamental features of the institutional and 
quasi-institutional forms of medical assistance that preceded it: Medicaid 
continues in an institutional bias, and it continues to serve people by category 
of disability.  For example, basic Medicaid program rules require states to 
 
 57. LUTZKY ET AL., supra note 24, at 4. 
 58. See, e.g., Youngberg v. Romeo, 457 U.S. 357 (1982) (restraint, neglect and abuse); 
O’Connor v. Donaldson, 22 U.S. 563 (1975) (unconstitutional confinement); Jackson v. Indiana, 
406 U.S. 715 (1972); New York State Ass’n for Retarded Children, Inc. v. Rockefeller, 357 F. 
Supp. 752 (D.C. N.Y. 1973) (fair process); Wyatt v. Aderholt, 503 F.2d 1305 (5th Cir. 1974); 
Halderman v. Pennhurst State School & Hosp., 610 F. Supp. 1221 (D.C. Pa. 1985) (right to 
treatment). 
 59. See, e.g., Ky. Ass’n for Retarded Citizens, Inc. v. Conn., 674 F.2d 582, 585 (6th Cir. 
1982) (Section 504 may require placement of people with developmental disabilities in least 
restrictive alternative, but does not prohibit all forms of institutionalization; state may expend 
funds to improve staffing and conditions in institutions); Halderman v. Pennhurst State Sch. & 
Hosp., 612 F.2d 84, 87 (3d Cir. 1979), rev’d on other grounds, 465 U.S. 89 (1984) 
(Developmentally Disabled Assistance and Bill of Rights Act provides the right to least 
restrictive environment); Garrity v. Gallen, 522 F. Supp. 171, 213-15 (D.C.N.H. 1981) (Section 
504 does not broadly compel deinstitutionalization; it does require individual service plans for 
individuals that may include independent living outside of institutions); cf. Halderman v. 
Pennhurst State School & Hosp., 610 F. Supp. 1221, 1227 (E.D. Pa. 1985) (Court approved class 
action settlement which compelled the closure of an institution). 
 60. LUTZKY ET AL., supra note 24, at 4. 
 61. HHS, UNDERSTANDING MEDICAID HOME AND COMMUNITY SERVICES, supra note 24, 
at 7-8. 
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provide an equal level of services to all qualified participants, without regard to 
diagnosis.62  However, under the Home and Community-Based Care Services 
(HCBS) waiver program, states may apply to the Federal Centers for Medicare 
and Medicaid Services (CMS) for waiver of this “comparability” requirement 
to assist only those “individuals who, in the absence of home care, would 
require [an] institutional level [of] services and benefits.”63  The HCBS waiver 
program is intended to foster more integrated living situations for elders and 
people with disabilities through a “broad variety of services that may be 
provided as part of the program,” including adult day care and health services, 
habilitation services, assistive technology and adaptive equipment, case 
management, personal care attendants, respite care, and vocational services.64  
States participating in the HCBS waiver program “may vary the benefits they 
offer by beneficiary sub-category,” (that is, they may restrict aid to certain 
types of disabilities or to certain age groups of beneficiaries) including elders, 
people with physical disabilities, people with developmental disabilities, 
individuals with traumatic brain injury, and people who have AIDS.65 
Because of the historical prohibition on use of Medicaid to pay the costs of 
confining non-elderly people in state psychiatric institutions, HCBS waivers 
often do not serve people with mental illnesses.66  States may choose to make 
supportive services available to people with mental illnesses under provisions 
for optional Medicaid services like personal care assistance, targeted case 
management, clinic services, and psychiatric rehabilitation services.  Like 
HCBS waivers, these options are exempt from the Medicaid comparability 
requirement, and many states elect to target optional services based on 
category of disability, including mental illness.67  Chronically homeless people 
 
 62. Rosenbaum, supra note 47, at 128-29 (citing 42 C.F.R. § 440.230 (2006)); see also 42 
U.S.C. § 1396a(a)(10)(B) (2006) (statutory “comparability” requirements). 
 63. Rosenbaum, supra note 47, at 129. 
 64. LUTZKY ET AL., supra note 24, at 16-17. 
 65. Id. at 2; see also ROSENBAUM, supra note 47, at 130; HHS, UNDERSTANDING MEDICAID 
HOME AND COMMUNITY SERVICES, supra note 24, at 49. 
 66. LUTZKY ET AL., supra note 24, at 6.  Recent legislation has de-coupled some waiver 
services from eligibility standards requiring people with disabilities to show that they “would 
require a level of provided in a hospital or a nursing facility or intermediate care facility for the 
mentally retarded” as a condition of qualifying for waiver services.  See P.L. 109-171, § 6086 
(Feb. 8, 2006), amending 42 U.S.C. §1396(n).  By separating eligibility for waiver services from 
need for Medicaid-covered institutional care, it is possible that more states may seek HCBS 
waivers to serve people with mental illnesses. 
 67. See generally HHS, UNDERSTANDING MEDICAID HOME AND COMMUNITY SERVICES, 
supra note 24, at 60-67.  For a detailed discussion of the provision of rehabilitation services to 
people with mental illnesses see BAZELON CENTER FOR MENTAL HEALTH LAW, RECOVERY IN 
THE COMMUNITY: FUNDING MENTAL HEALTH REHABILITATIVE APPROACHES UNDER MEDICAID 
(2001). 
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may receive services offered through the substance abuse treatment system.68  
That system is also characterized by a history that begins with institutional 
forms of treatment and a paradigm shift to community-based options.69  And, 
like other forms of supportive services, treatment for substance abuse is made 
available through funding streams that serve only people with substance abuse 
problems.70 
Medicaid expenditures exert tremendous fiscal pressures on state and 
federal budgets.  As a consequence, limitations on eligibility for community-
based services are designed to control cost.  For example, HCBS waivers are 
available only to those states that “demonstrate that on average, spending for 
those receiving waiver services would not exceed the average cost of those in 
institutions.”71  Other strategies for limiting cost include “placing caps on 
spending per recipient or limiting the number of participants,” imposing 
limitations on program eligibility “by degree of impairment or financial need,” 
and use of waiting lists.72  They also rely on diagnosis-specific eligibility 
criteria to target “services to those most likely to be institutionalized” in 
facilities identified by category of disability.73 
There is one last feature of supportive services systems that derives in part 
from the categorical organization of the old system of institutions, and in part 
from the integrationist mandate of civil rights laws.  Supportive services are 
usually delivered not through a single agency, but through separate agencies 
and organizations that are identified by type of disability.74  Under Olmstead 
the obligation to administer services in the most appropriate integrated setting 
means that state agencies must maintain a “comprehensive, effectively 
working plan for placing qualified persons with. . . disabilities in less 
restrictive settings, and a waiting list that move[s] at a reasonable pace not 
controlled by the State’s endeavors to keep its institutions fully populated.”75  
The responsibility to develop a moving waiting list in the face of scarce 
housing resources means the separate state agencies that maintain institutions 
serving categories of people with disabilities must control the community 
placements made available to their individual consumers.  It is therefore 
 
 68. HHS, BLUEPRINT FOR CHANGE, supra note 4, at 5. 
 69. Id.; Paul J. Carling & Laurie Curtis, Implementing Supported Housing: Current Trends 
and Future Directions, NEW DIRECTIONS FOR MENTAL HEALTH SERVICES 81 (Summer 1997) 
[hereinafter Carling & Curtis, Implementing Supported Housing]. 
 70. HHS, BLUEPRINT FOR CHANGE, supra note 4, at 19. 
 71. LUTZKY ET AL., supra note 24, at 3.  The cost neutrality standard was recently eased in 
connection with certain types of waiver services.  See, P.L. 109-171, §6086(a)(i)(1) (Feb. 8, 
2006). 
 72. LUTZKY ET AL., supra note 24, at 30. 
 73. Id. 
 74. HHS, UNDERSTANDING MEDICAID HOME AND COMMUNITY SERVICES, supra note 24, 
at 148-52. 
 75. Olmstead v. L.C., 527 U.S. 581, 583 (1999) (emphasis added). 
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common within the supportive service system that housing placements are only 
available through agencies that demand control over the housing waiting list 
and the “pipeline” of individuals that enter and move through the waiting list.  
That imperative, though driven in part by the civil rights obligation to comply 
with Olmstead, competes with the integrationist notions at work in housing 
programs.  It is a point of disconnect where the supportive services system and 
the system of affordable housing fail to work together. 
IV.  PEOPLE WITH DISABILITIES IN HOUSING PROGRAMS 
Medicaid and other forms of supportive services pay for the service 
component of supportive housing.  Service dollars do not pay for room, board, 
or rent.76  To create supportive housing opportunities, it is therefore essential 
to find ways to assure that people with disabilities and chronically homeless 
people also have access to mainstream affordable housing programs.77  
Federal, state, and local funds may all serve as sources of financing for 
affordable housing.78  As a practical matter, due to conditions of poverty, 
housing is often affordable to people with disabilities only when it receives 
capital funding from multiple state and federal sources, and rent subsidies, 
usually federal rent subsidies, to supplement very modest tenant rent 
contributions.79  The federal housing resources available for these purposes are 
characterized by an inconsistent mix of policies that tend to limit or forbid 
preferences for people with specific categories of disability.  At the same time, 
federal housing policy often excludes people from mainstream affordable 
housing opportunities based on their status as individuals with disabilities. 
Some supportive housing is funded by programs administered through 
HUD’s Office of Community Planning and Development (CPD).  CPD 
provides capital and operating support for homeless programs established 
under the McKinney-Vento Homeless Assistance Act,80 the program of 
 
 76. 42 U.S.C. § 1396n(c)(1) (2006) (no HCBS payment for room and board); see also HHS, 
UNDERSTANDING MEDICAID HOME AND COMMUNITY SERVICES, supra note 24, at 58-59 
(Medicaid payments under HCBS not available for room and board), 71 (no Medicaid payment 
for residential costs of habilitation programs), 96 (Medicaid payment for assisted living services, 
but not cost of housing). 
 77. HHS, UNDERSTANDING MEDICAID HOME AND COMMUNITY SERVICES, supra note 24, 
at 97; HHS, BLUEPRINT FOR CHANGE, supra note 4, at 52-54. 
 78. HHS, BLUEPRINT FOR CHANGE, supra note 4, at 21-23. 
 79. O’HARA & DAY, supra note 2, at 19; see also Joseph Harkness, Sandra Newman, 
George Galster & James Reschovsky, The Financial Viability of Housing for Mentally Ill 
Persons, 15 HOUSING POLICY DEBATE 133, 139-40 (multiple capital subsidies), 153 (rental 
subsidies) (FannieMae Foundation, 2004). 
 79. HHS, BLUEPRINT FOR CHANGE, supra note 4, at 21-23. 
 80. P.L. 100-77 (Jul. 22, 1987), codified at 42 U.S.C. § 11301, et seq. (2006). 
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Housing Opportunities for People with AIDS (HOPWA),81 and HOME 
Investment Partnerships (HOME) program.82  It is within these programs that 
HUD policies display the greatest inconsistency.  The statute governing 
HOPWA requires that the program serve only people with AIDS and related 
disorders.83  The McKinney-Vento Shelter Plus Care program targets 
assistance to eligible “homeless person with disabilities (primarily persons who 
are seriously mentally ill, have chronic problems with alcohol, drugs, or both, 
or have acquired immunodeficiency syndrome and related diseases).”84  HUD 
rules interpret the statute to say that providers may establish a preference for 
people within a single category of eligible homeless individuals, but may 
exclude other groups of homeless people with disabilities only when there is 
sufficient demand for the housing within the target population, and only when 
the other homeless people cannot benefit from the services offered by the 
provider.85  Current rules in the Supportive Housing Program (SHP) also allow 
targeting of units to designated populations of people with disabilities.86 
Housing financed with funds provided to state or local jurisdictions from 
the HOME Investment Partnerships (HOME) program may include 
“permanent housing for disabled homeless persons, transitional housing, and 
single room occupancy housing.”87  HOME funds may be used for both tenant-
based rental assistance and capital funding for construction and 
rehabilitation.88  Use of HOME funds is subject to federal consolidated 
planning requirements that mandate an assessment of community housing 
needs, including the needs of people with disabilities.89  Consolidated planning 
standards instruct jurisdictions to review the needs of people who “may or may 
not require supportive housing (i.e., elderly, frail elderly, persons with 
disabilities (mental, physical, developmental), persons with alcohol or other 
drug addiction, persons with HIV/AIDS and their families, and public housing 
residents)” and to devise and carry out strategies intended to meet those 
needs.90 
Despite the statutory and regulatory standards that seem to favor HOME-
funded supportive housing serving categories of people with disabilities, 
 
 81. AIDS Housing Opportunity Act, P.L. 101-625, § 851, et seq., codified at 42 U.S.C. § 
12901, et seq. (2006). 
 82. 42 U.S.C. § 12721, et seq. (2006). 
 83. 42 U.S.C. § 12901 (2006). 
 84. 42 U.S.C. § 11403g (2006). 
 85. 24 C.F.R. § 582.330(a) (2006). 
 86. 24 C.F.R. § 583.325(a). 
 87. 42 U.S.C. § 12742(a)(1). 
 88. Id. 
 89. See 42 U.S.C. § 12746(5) (2006) (HOME is subject to consolidated planning 
requirements for comprehensive housing affordability strategy); 42 U.S.C. § 12705(b)(1) and 
(i)(2) (consolidated plan must address housing needs of people with disabilities). 
 90. See, e.g., 24 C.F.R. § 91.215(e) (2006) (with respect to local jurisdictions). 
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HUD’s implementation of the program is equivocal.  Rules governing the use 
of HOME for tenant-based rental assistance permit selection preferences “for a 
specific category of individuals with disabilities (e.g. persons with HIV/AIDS 
or chronic mental illness) if the specific category is identified in the 
participating jurisdiction’s consolidated plan as having unmet need and the 
preference is needed to narrow the gap in benefits and services to such 
persons . . .[p]references cannot be administered in a manner that limits the 
opportunities of persons” based on federal civil rights laws.91  There are no 
comparable regulations for capital use of HOME funds.  Early guidance from 
1997 indicates that while selection preferences may be offered to a category of 
people with disabilities in housing using HOME capital funds, eligibility 
cannot be limited to a category of people with disabilities.92  Instead, “housing 
projects of five or more HOME-assisted units must be affirmatively marketed 
to all persons within the special needs group.”93  In addition, “[A] project may 
not be filled exclusively through referrals from a single social service 
agency.”94 
Later policy statements from 2001 emphasized the availability of HOME 
funds for “special needs housing,” including “such traditional housing as 
single-family homes and apartments, as well as single room occupancy 
housing and group homes.”95  The 2001 policy showcased HOME projects that 
served discrete populations, such as people with chronic mental illnesses, frail 
elders, drug and alcohol dependent women, people with physical disabilities, 
people with mental retardation, and people with HIV/AIDS.96  Still later, in 
2005, HOME program fair housing guidelines said that in special needs 
housing for people with disabilities, “the housing must be marketed to all 
individuals with disabilities and cannot be restricted to persons with specific 
types of diagnoses or subclasses of persons with disabilities.”97 
Other housing programs display a similar range of sometimes 
contradictory policies.  In the public housing, tenant-based Section 8 Housing 
Choice Voucher, and multifamily subsidized housing programs administered 
by HUD, agency regulations permit selection preferences that favor people 
with disabilities in general, but they explicitly forbid preferences that are 
 
 91. 24 C.F.R. § 92.209(c)(3). 
 92. See HOMEfires, Vol. 1, No. 4 (Oct. 30, 1997). 
 93. Id. 
 94. Id. 
 95. HUD OFFICE OF COMMUNITY PLANNING AND DEVELOPMENT, HUD-2001-18-CPD, 
SPECIAL NEEDS HOUSING AND THE HOME PROGRAM 1 (May 2001). 
 96. Id. at 25, 28 (mental illness), 26-27 (elders), 29 (chemically dependent women), 33 
(physical and developmental disabilities), 37 (mental retardation), 35 (HIV/AIDS). 
 97. HUD OFFICE OF COMMUNITY PLANNING AND DEVELOPMENT, HUD-2005-10-CPD, 
FAIR HOUSING FOR HOME PROGRAM PARTICIPANTS: UNDERSTANDING THE BASICS 9 (May 
2005). 
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targeted at people with a specific category of disability.98  Other prohibitions 
apply in HUD programs where supportive services are part of the program 
design.  The Section 811 program of Housing and Supportive Services for 
People with Disabilities (Section 811) links capital grants, project rental 
assistance contracts, and supportive services in housing serving people with 
“physical, mental, or emotional impairment[s]” and individuals with 
developmental disabilities.99  Under program requirements, “[a]n Owner may, 
with the approval of [HUD], limit occupancy. . . to persons with disabilities 
who have similar disabilities and require a similar set of supportive services in 
a supportive housing environment.  However, the Owner must permit 
occupancy by any qualified person with a disability who could benefit from the 
housing and/or services provided regardless of the person’s disability.”100 
HUD’s Project-Based Section 8 Housing Choice Voucher program adopts 
a mix of approaches.  Public housing agencies (PHA) are permitted to “project-
base” up to twenty percent of the PHA’s Section 8 Housing Choice Vouchers 
by entering into contracts with private owners to attach vouchers to units.101  In 
general, the percentage of assisted units in any building may not exceed 
twenty-five percent.102  The twenty-five percent per building cap does not 
apply to dwelling units “specifically made available for households comprised 
of elderly families, disabled families, and families receiving supportive 
services,” making it clear that the program is intended in part to provide 
supportive housing to people with disabilities.103  Project-based voucher 
providers may not limit admission by category of disability.104  Providers may 
limit eligibility to people “who need services offered at a particular project.”105  
Like the Section 811 program, an owner may “advertise the project as offering 
services for a particular type of disability; however, the project must be open to 
all otherwise eligible persons with disabilities who may benefit from services 
provided in the project.”106  Preferences that base admission on establishing 
need for services are only permitted in order to serve individuals: 
(i) . . .with disabilities that significantly interfere with their ability to obtain 
and maintain themselves in housing; (ii) Who, without appropriate supportive 
 
 98. 24 C.F.R. § 5.655(c)(3) (2006) (multifamily subsidized housing); 24 C.F.R. 
§960.206(b)(3) (2006) (public housing); 24 C.F.R. §982.207(b)(3) (2006) (tenant-based Housing 
Choice Vouchers). 
 99. 42 U.S.C. § 8013(k)(2) (2006). 
 100. 24 C.F.R. § 891.410(c)(2) (2006); see also 42 U.S.C. § 8013(i)(2) (similar effect). 
 101. See generally 42 U.S.C. §1437f(o)(13) (2006). 
 102. 42 U.S.C. § 1437f(o)(13)(D)(ii) (2006). 
 103. See 24 C.F.R. § 983.251(d) (2006). 
 104. Id. 
 105. Id. 
 106. Id. at (d)(3). 
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services, will not be able to obtain or maintain themselves in housing; and (iii) 
For whom such services cannot be provided in a nonsegregated setting.107 
The largest program providing capital funding for affordable housing is the 
Low Income Housing Tax Credit (LIHTC) program administered by the 
Internal Revenue Service (IRS).108  Acting through state housing credit 
agencies, the program provides allocations of tax credits to housing developers 
that sell the credits to investors to provide capital funds for the construction or 
rehabilitation of rent restricted housing for low income households.109  
Supportive housing is a permissible use of tax credits.110  Civil rights 
requirements in the LIHTC program are embodied in a rule under which 
dwelling units qualify for credits only if they are available “for use by the 
general public.”111  To meet this standard, tax credit units must be rented 
consistent with HUD non-discrimination rules, including the provisions of a 
HUD handbook governing multifamily subsidized housing programs.112  In 
addition, they must not be constructed for the exclusive use of a limited class 
of people such as “a member of a social organization.”113 
In the single interpretive ruling addressing limitations based on type of 
disability, the IRS said that low rent units qualify for tax credits where, for 
example, they are part of a project for homeless individuals with a selection 
preference for people with alcohol and chemical dependencies.114  The 
 
 107. Id. at (d)(1). 
 108. HUD, THE LOW-INCOME HOUSING TAX CREDIT PROGRAM: A NATIONAL SURVEY OF 
OWNERS 1 (Mar. 2000). 
 109. See generally 26 U.S.C. § 42 (2006). 
 110. See, e.g., 26 U.S.C. § 42(c)(2) (properties with Section 8 moderate rehabilitation 
assistance are ineligible for credits, except for housing for homeless people); 26 U.S.C. § 
42(c)(3)(B)(iii)(I) (transient housing not permitted use in tax credit program except for housing 
used exclusively to facilitate the transition of homeless individuals to independent living), § 
42(c)(3)(B)(iii)(II) (to same effect, housing made available by government entities and non-
profits to provide homeless individuals with temporary housing and supportive services designed 
to assist in locating and retaining permanent housing); 26 U.S.C. § 42(g)(2)(B) (services that 
“enable residents of a residential rental property to remain independent and avoid placement in a 
hospital, nursing home, or intermediate care facility for the mentally or physically handicapped”); 
26 U.S.C. § 42(m)(1)(C)(v) (state qualified allocation plans for distribution of tax credits must 
include selection criteria for “tenant populations with special needs”). 
 111. 26 C.F.R. § 1.42-9(a) (2006). 
 112. Id.  The handbook referenced in the rule is HUD HANDBOOK NO. 4350.3, REV-1, 
OCCUPANCY REQUIREMENTS OF SUBSIDIZED MULTIFAMILY HOUSING PROGRAMS (May 2003) 
[hereinafter HUD, MULTIFAMILY OCCUPANCY HANDBOOK]. 
 113. 26 C.F.R. § 1.42-9(b). The general public use rule also forbids housing “provided by an 
employer for its employees.” 26 C.F.R. § 1.42-9(a). In addition,  “any residential rental unit that 
is part of a hospital, nursing home, sanitarium, lifecare facility, trailer park, or intermediate care 
facility for the mentally and physically handicapped is not for use by the general public and is not 
eligible for credit under Section 42.”  26 C.F.R. § 1.42-9(b). 
 114. I.R.S. Priv. Ltr. Rul. 98-14-006 (Apr. 3, 1998). 
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selection preference was permitted only because the units were also made 
available to all homeless applicants, without regard to disability.115  The 
general public use rule’s prohibition on limiting occupancy to members of a 
particular class of individuals also suggests that a unit will not qualify for tax 
credits if it is rented solely to consumers of a specific agency serving a 
particular category of disability, a policy comparable to the one at work in 
some HOME program guidance.116 
Despite the ethic of “nonsegregation” articulated in agency regulations, in 
practice, HUD maintains policies that are designed to deliberately exclude 
people with disabilities from federal housing programs.  Prior to 1992, 
apartments in HUD-administered “mixed-population” public housing and 
multifamily housing developments were required to rent to non-elderly people 
with disabilities and elders on an equal basis.117  “The shift away from 
institutional to community-based mental health care, recent regulations that 
prohibit discrimination in housing, and the lack of affordable housing. . . all 
contributed to growing numbers of” people with disabilities living in mixed-
population housing.118 
Spurred on by concerns about “differences in values and lifestyle” as well 
as complaints about people with mental illnesses, Congress enacted laws that 
permit PHAs and owners of multifamily subsidized housing to limit and at 
times exclude non-elders with disabilities from assisted housing.119  Estimates 
are that by 2001, the new policies resulted in a loss of access by people with 
disabilities to 68,500 previously available public housing units, and between 
200,000 to 225,000 assisted multifamily units.120  The estimates do not 
 
 115. Id.  The IRS ruling ignored provisions of the MULTIFAMILY OCCUPANCY HANDBOOK 
permitting “preferences for persons with a specific type of disability” when “allowed in the 
controlling documents for the property.”  See HUD, MULTIFAMILY OCCUPANCY HANDBOOK, 
supra note 115, para. 4-6(C)(3).  The reference in the handbook to controlling documents is 
meant to refer to contractual documents associated primarily with HUD’s Section 202 Direct 
Loan Program. 
 116. See HOMEfires, Vol. 1, No. 4, supra note 95; cf. I.R.S. Priv. Ltr. Rul. 92-09-020 (1992) 
(units in transitional housing facility for homeless families are available for use by the general 
public for purposes of tax exempt bonds even where county social services agency is the sole 
source of referrals). 
 117. GOVERNMENT ACCOUNTING OFFICE, GAO/RCED-92-81, PUBLIC HOUSING: HOUSING 
PERSONS WITH MENTAL DISABILITIES WITH THE ELDERLY (Aug. 1992). 
 118. Id. at 3. 
 119. See P.L. 102-550 (Oct. 21, 1992), Title VI-C, § 622(a), enacting 42 U.S.C. § 1437e 
(2006) (PHAs may designate some or all of any public housing development solely for occupancy 
by elders, solely for occupancy by people with disabilities, or for mixed use); Title VI-D, § 641, 
et seq., enacting 42 U.S.C. § 13601, et seq. (2006) (owners of multifamily subsidized housing 
may limit or exclude occupancy by non-elders with disabilities). 
 120. Consortium for Citizens with Disabilities and Technical Assistance Collaborative, 
OPENING DOORS, WHAT’S WRONG WITH THIS PICTURE? 5 (public housing), 15 (multifamily 
housing) (2001). 
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measure the level of exclusion from HUD-funded housing based on the actions 
of housing providers who disregard even the limited protections available to 
people with disabilities under these laws.  There is compelling evidence that 
disability discrimination plays a significant role in additional limitations on 
access to mainstream affordable housing opportunities.121  This combination of 
legally permitted exclusion and unlawful discrimination against people with 
disabilities stands in stark contrast to the desire to create “nonsegregated” 
housing opportunities embodied in federal housing policies. 
V.  COMPETING CONCEPTS OF INTEGRATION? 
The federal trend towards forbidding occupancy standards based on 
category of disability is not necessarily reflected in state laws, particularly 
those laws that are focused on the command of Olmstead to provide 
community-based housing options outside of institutions.  States use a variety 
of funding mechanisms to plan and provide for community-based housing for 
people with mental illnesses, people with mental retardation and related 
conditions, and people with chemical dependencies.  Some of these sources of 
financing are linked directly to services provided under HCBS waivers, and 
therefore limit occupancy based on category of disability.  Others result in 
housing that is limited to consumers of the services of particular mental health 
or homeless agencies.122 
 
 121. See HUD, OFFICE OF POLICY DEVELOPMENT AND RESEARCH, REPORT TO CONGRESS: 
ASSESSMENT OF THE LOSS OF HOUSING FOR NON-ELDERLY PEOPLE WITH DISABILITIES, FINAL 
REPORT 5-2 (2000) (managers of assisted multifamily housing “report illegal practices that 
discourage people with disabilities from applying for HUD-assisted housing even though the 
potential applicant is eligible under the property’s occupancy policy”); see also Matyasovszky v. 
Housing Authority of the City of Bridgeport, 226 F.R.D. 35 (D. Conn. 2005) (certifying class 
action complaint alleging unlawful discrimination in exclusion of people with disabilities from 
public housing); Bailey v. Housing Authority of the City of Baltimore, JFM-02-CV-225 (Dec. 20, 
2004); U.S. v. Housing Authority of the City of Baltimore, JFM-04-CV-03107(Dec. 20, 2004) 
(consent decree, discriminatory exclusion of people with disabilities from public housing), 
available at http://www.usdoj.gov/crt/housing/documents/habc3settle.pdf (last visited Mar. 2, 
2007). 
 122. See, e.g., CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 53260 (West 2006) (“supportive housing” is 
housing occupied by a “target population,” defined as low-income adults with one or more 
disabilities, including mental illnesses, HIV or AIDS, substance abuse, people with 
developmental disabilities, and others); CONN. GEN. STAT. § 17a-485 (2006) (Community Mental 
Health Strategic Investment Fund for new and expanded clinical services and supportive housing 
for people with mental health needs); CONN. GEN. STAT. § 17b-337(a) (2006) (long term care 
plan for elders must include home and community-based services and supportive housing); ILL. 
COMP. STAT. Ch. 405, § 30/4.4 (2006) (savings from reduction in institutional services redirected 
to “create an array of residential and community-based support services to people with mental 
health needs and developmental disabilities”); MASS. SPEC. L. ch. S7, § 2 (West 1992) 
(Massachusetts Housing Finance Agency authorized to make loans for provision of community-
based residences to people with disabilities); 2004 Mass. Acts ch. 290, line 4000-8200 (West 
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In an environment where it is almost always necessary to combine state 
and federal resources to develop supportive housing, it can be difficult to 
reconcile the targeted nature of state funding in service of Olmstead with 
HUD’s competing prohibition on limiting occupancy to people with specific 
disabilities.  HUD regulations prohibiting preferences based on category of 
disability are not themselves civil rights laws.  They are “civil rights-related 
program requirements,” intended to interpret civil rights statutes in the context 
of specific housing programs.123  It is another curious feature of HUD housing 
programs that in contrast to civil rights-related program requirements, civil 
rights laws protecting people with disabilities do not preclude housing 
programs serving a category of people with disabilities so long as the programs 
serve integrative purposes. 
Under HUD Fair Housing Act rules, for example, it is permissible to 
inquire about disability when necessary “to determine whether an applicant is 
qualified for a dwelling available only to persons with handicaps (sic) or to 
persons with a particular type of handicap” or “to determine whether an 
applicant for a dwelling is qualified for a priority available to persons with 
handicaps or to persons with a particular type of handicap.”124  It is, however, 
unlawful to assign “any person to a particular section of a community, 
neighborhood or development, or to a particular floor of a building” based on 
disability.125 
 
2004) (funding for community-based housing for people with mental illnesses and mental 
retardation, including clients of state Departments of Mental Health and Mental Retardation); 
2004 Mass. Acts ch. 290, line 4000-8201 (West 2004) (to same effect, for other people with 
disabilities at risk of institutionalization); MINN. STAT. § 252.50 (2003) (community-based 
housing for people with mental retardation or related conditions linking housing programs of state 
housing finance agency and HCBS waiver services); MO. REV. STAT. § 215.054 (2000) (Mental 
Health Trust Fund to establish community-based housing for clients of the Department of Mental 
Health who have a mental illness, developmental disabilities, or are chemically dependent); NEB. 
REV. STAT. § 68-1605 (2003) (Homeless Shelter Assistance Trust Fund to finance grants for 
projects that provide for “persons or families with special housing needs”); WASH. REV. CODE § 
43.79.201 (1998) (funds appropriated for community-based housing for people with mental 
illnesses, developmental disabilities, or “youth who are blind, deaf or otherwise disabled”); 
WASH. REV. CODE § 82.14.400 (2000) (portion of sales and use tax for zoos, aquarium and 
wildlife preserves transferred to Department of Community, Trade, and Economic Development 
to maintain community-based housing for people with mental illnesses). 
 123. See 60 Fed. Reg. 14294 (Mar. 16, 1995) (civil rights-related program  requirements 
(CRRPRs) “may be written into the statute or regulations governing the specific program at issue.  
CRRPRs may also be found within such sources as general civil rights statutes, HUD Notices of 
Funding Availability (NOFAs), and Mortgagee Letters.  The subjects covered under CRRPRs 
include but are not limited to such topics as affirmative fair housing marketing, site and 
neighborhood standards, assurances or certifications of compliance with civil rights statutes, and 
monitoring recipient performance for compliance with civil rights requirements”). 
 124. 24 C.F.R. § 100.202(c)(2), (3) (2006). 
 125. 24 C.F.R. § 100.70(c)(4) (2006). 
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Title VIII’s balance between integration and recognition of disability is 
more fully developed in Section 504 and the ADA.  Section 504 and ADA 
rules are modeled on similar rules that implement prohibitions against 
discrimination based on race, color, and ethnicity under Title VI of the Civil 
Rights Act of 1964, and discrimination based on gender under Title IX of the 
Education Amendments Act of 1972.126  There is, however, a fundamental 
difference between principles of disability discrimination and the law of race 
and gender discrimination: 
The premise of both title VI and title IX is that there are no inherent 
differences or inequalities between the general public and the persons 
protected by these statutes and, therefore, there should be no differential 
treatment in the administration of Federal programs.  The concept of section 
504, on the other hand, is far more complex.  Handicapped persons may 
require different treatment in order to be afforded equal access to federally 
assisted programs and activities, and identical treatment may, in fact, constitute 
discrimination.  The problem of establishing general rules as to when different 
treatment is prohibited or required is compounded by the diversity of existing 
handicaps and the differing degree to which particular persons may be 
affected.  Thus, under section 504, questions arise as to when different 
treatment of handicapped persons should be considered improper and when it 
should be required.127 
Section 504 and ADA attempt to resolve these questions by recognizing 
that “different or special treatment” is permitted only “in order to assure equal 
opportunity.”128  HUD Section 504 rules and ADA Title II rules are explicit: 
different or separate services and benefits are permitted, and in some 
circumstances may be required when necessary to provide an “opportunity that 
is as effective as offered to others.”129  The statutory provisions of Title III of 
the ADA are identical.130  Title III is applicable to supportive housing because 
it prohibits disability discrimination in places of public accommodation, 
including social service centers such as “substance abuse treatment centers, 
 
 126. See 41 Fed. Reg. 20295, 20296 (May 17, 1976) (to be codified at 45 C.F.R. pt. 84) 
(preamble to proposed Section 504 rules for Department of Health, Education and Welfare); 42 
Fed. Reg. 22675, 22676 (May 4, 1977) (preamble to final HEW Section 504 rules); 43 Fed. Reg. 
2131, 2132 (Jan.13, 1978) (preamble to HEW Section 504 coordination rules for federal 
agencies); 48 Fed. Reg. 20637, 20639 (May 6, 1983) (to be codified at 24 C.F.R. pt. 8) (preamble 
to proposed HUD Section 504 rules).  Title VI is codified at 42 U.S.C. § 2000d (2006).  Title IX 
is codified at 20 U.S.C. § 1681, et seq. (2006). 
 127. 41 Fed. Reg. 20296; 48 Fed. Reg. 20639. 
 128. 42 Fed. Reg. 22676. 
 129. 24 C.F.R. § 8. 4(b)(1)(iv) (HUD §504 rules); 28 C.F.R. § 35.130(b)(1)(iv) (ADA Title II 
regulations). 
 130. See 42 U.S.C. § 12182(b)(1)(iii) (separate programs for categories of people with 
disabilities are permitted when necessary to provide an “opportunity that is as effective as offered 
to others”). 
SAINT LOUIS UNIVERISTY SCHOOL OF LAW 
26 SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY PUBLIC LAW REVIEW [Vol. 26:3 
rape crisis centers, and halfway houses. . . residential facilities that provide 
social services, including homeless shelters, shelters for people seeking refuge 
from domestic violence, nursing homes, residential care facilities, and other 
facilities where persons may reside for varying lengths of time” while 
receiving supportive services.131 
The ADA Title II regulation that is the foundation of Olmstead is an 
extension of these ideas.  In promulgating the rule, the Department of Justice 
said that the Title II “most integrated setting” rules are founded on explicit 
Congressional “authority for separate programs in the specific requirements of 
title III of the Act.”132  HUD civil rights-related program requirements that 
forbid categorical preferences originate from a different vantage.  They derive 
from a fair housing perspective that is more closely aligned to Title VI and 
Title IX: protected characteristics should, in the first instance, be neutral and 
invisible in the distribution of housing opportunities.  There is considerable 
conflict within this point of view, especially because HUD and other federal 
agencies are obliged by law to “administer their programs and activities 
relating to housing and urban development. . . in a manner to affirmatively 
further the purposes of” fair housing.133  The contradictory impulses are most 
evident in the context of race, where the courts have long struggled with the 
circumstances under which it is appropriate to make race-conscious decisions 
about preferences for admission in order to preserve or promote integrated 
patterns of residential living.134 
The same tensions filtered into debates about HUD fair housing policies in 
the promulgation of Title VIII rules for the implementation of the Fair Housing 
Amendments Act of 1988, which added protections to the Fair Housing Act for 
 
 131. 42 U.S.C. § 12181(7)(K) (Title III definition of “public accommodation”); see also 56 
Fed. Reg. 35544, 35551 (Jul. 26, 1991) (to be codified at 28 C.F.R. pt. 36) (discussing Title III 
definition of “public accommodation”). 
 132. See 56 Fed. Reg. 35703, 35705 (Jul. 26, 1991).  These principles also have a 
constitutional dimension.  In applying Fourteenth Amendment concepts of equal protection to the 
rights of people with disabilities, the courts say that classifications based on disability are, unlike 
racial classifications, entitled to considerable deference because, among other reasons, “singling 
out the [individuals with disabilities] for special treatment reflects the real and undeniable 
differences between” them and people without disabilities, and among people with different 
disabilities.  City of Cleburne, Texas v. Cleburne Living Center, Inc., 473 U.S. 432, 443, 444 
(1985). 
 133. 42 U.S.C. § 3608(d) (2006). 
 134. Cf. Walker v. City of Mesquite, 169 F.3d 973, 987 (5th Cir. 1999) (rejecting selection of 
site for construction of housing in implementation of civil rights consent decree based on racial 
characteristics of neighborhood); U.S. v. Starrett City Assoc., 840 F.2d 1096, 1100-1101 (2d Cir. 
1988) (rejecting selection practices intended to stabilize racial composition of housing 
development), with Raso v. Lago, 135 F.3d 11, 17 (1st Cir. 1998), cert. denied, 119 S.Ct. 44 
(1998) (use of race conscious marketing targets to establish occupancy patterns in assisted 
housing is lawful for purposes of implementing civil right consent decree). 
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people with disabilities and families with children.135  On the one hand, civil 
rights advocates “interpreted certain illustrations of conduct made unlawful in 
the proposed rule as prohibiting the use of governmentally approved programs 
designed to promote greater housing opportunities.”136  On the other hand, “a 
comment from an association representing persons involved in the sale and 
rental of dwellings urged that the proposed rule be revised to make it clear that 
such practices are prohibited by the Fair Housing Act.”137  Noting that in 
making changes to Title VIII, Congress debated and postponed action on 
proposals to outlaw “preferences in the provision of any dwelling based on 
race, color, religion, gender or national origin,” HUD chose against addressing 
questions of affirmative action, determining “that it would not be appropriate 
to address the issue of pro-integration programs in this final rule.”138  To the 
extent that current HUD rules permit activities that account for protected 
characteristics, those activities are limited to imposing requirements on HUD-
assisted multifamily owners “to identify any groups of persons who are not 
likely to be aware of the available housing and to undertake special marketing 
efforts designed to make such persons aware of the available housing and their 
ability to obtain it on a nondiscriminatory basis.”139 
The cautionary tensions inherent in allowing housing practices based on 
protected characteristics have a particular import for people with disabilities.  
Such practices often have the effect of excluding people with disfavored 
disabilities from mainstream housing opportunities.  For example, 
longstanding provisions of agency Section 504 rules permit “[n]on-
handicapped persons” to be “excluded from the benefits of a program” and 
allow the exclusion of a “specific class of individuals with handicaps,” if the 
program “is limited by Federal statute or executive order to” people with 
disabilities, or a “class of individuals” with disabilities.140  The regulations are 
intended to exempt such federal programs as the Section 202 program of 
 
 135. The Fair Housing Amendments Act of 1988 was passed as P.L. 100-430 (September 13, 
1988).  For provisions adding protections for families with children and people with disabilities, 
see, e.g., P.L. 100-430, §6(b)(2) (families with children) and §6(b)(1) (people with disabilities), 
enacting 42 U.S.C. §3604(a)-(e) (2006). 
 136. 54 Fed. Reg. 3232, 3234-3235 (Jan. 23, 1989) (to be codified at 24 C.F.R. pt. 100). 
 137. Id. 
 138. Id. 
 139. 54 Fed. Reg. 3235; see also 24 C.F.R. § 200.600, et seq; 24 C.F.R. § 108.1, et seq 
(affirmative fair housing marketing requirements for multifamily owners); 24 C.F.R. § 92.351 (to 
same effect, HOME program). 
 140. See, e.g., 24 C.F.R. § 8.4(c)(1) (2006) (HUD Section 504 rules).  The same standards are 
applicable to all federal agencies through the Section 504 coordinating regulations published by 
the U.S. Department of Justice.  28 C.F.R. § 41.51(c) (2006). 
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housing for elders and people with disabilities from the integrationist and equal 
opportunity mandates of Section 504.141 
In the Section 202 program, HUD allows housing providers to select 
applicants from favored categories such as people with physical disabilities.142  
The policies decidedly do not operate to enhance equal opportunity.  Rather, 
they operate for the explicit purpose of excluding people with mental illnesses 
and developmental disabilities from Section 202 units.143  Policies like these 
have another discriminatory effect.  They tend to concentrate people with 
disabilities in the group homes and halfway houses that are characteristic of 
continuum facilities.  In the wake of implementing formal policies for 
excluding people with disabilities from Section 202 properties, HUD noted that 
barely 10% of the previously available units in the program remained available 
to people with disabilities.144  Of those, 75% were located in group homes 
serving only “persons with chronic mental illness or developmental 
 
 141. See 53 Fed. Reg. 20216, 20220 (Jun. 2, 1988) (to be codified at 24 C.F.R. pt. 8) 
(promulgating interim Section 504 regulations for programs receiving HUD assistance) 
(exclusion of categories of people with disabilities “does not violate Section 504” when 
authorized by statute or executive order).  The analogous provision under Title II of the ADA 
allows categorical exclusions only in limited circumstances, enabling public entities to “provide 
special benefits, beyond those required by the nondiscrimination requirements of [the ADA], that 
are limited to individuals with disabilities or a particular class of individuals with disabilities, 
without thereby incurring additional obligations to persons without disabilities or to other classes 
of individuals with disabilities.”  56 Fed. Reg. 35693, 35705 (Jul. 26, 1991) (to be codified at 28 
C.F.R. pt. 35) (discussing purpose of 28 C.F.R. § 35.130(c)).  For another example of a statutory 
program designed to serve people within a single category of disability, see 42 U.S.C. § 12901, et 
seq. (2006) (Housing Opportunities for People with AIDS). 
 142. 53 Fed. Reg. 20220 (Jun. 2, 1988) (to be codified at 24 C.F.R. pt. 8); see also 
MULTIFAMILY OCCUPANCY Handbook, supra note 112, at para. 3-18(B)(2)(c)(3), (7) (10% of 
units in §202 properties for elders are set aside for any person with disabilities with mobility 
impairments; only elders qualify for remaining units and individuals with non-qualified 
disabilities who are not elders do not qualify).  The exclusions imposed by these occupancy 
standards apply to properties developed under the Section 202 Direct Loan Program in effect 
from 1959 to 1990.  Id.  Statutory changes in 1990 separated housing for people with disabilities 
from the Section 202 program by creating two new programs; a new Section 202 program of 
housing and supportive services for elders, and a companion Section 811 program of housing and 
supportive services for people with disabilities.  See P.L. 101-625, Title VIII, § 801(a) (Nov. 28, 
1990), amending 12 U.S.C. § 1701q (§ 202) and at Title VIII, § 811, adding 42 U.S.C. § 8013 (§ 
811).  References in this section of the paper are to the pre-1990 version of the Section 202 
program. 
 143. See Beckert v. Our Lady of Angels Apartments, Inc., 192 F.3d 601, 607 (6th Cir. 1999) 
(excluding person with mental illness); Knutzen v. Eben Ezer Lutheran Hous. Ctr., 815 F.2d 1343 
(10th Cir. 1987) (excluding people with mental illnesses and developmental disabilities); Brecker 
v. Queens B’nai B’rith Housing Dev. Fund Co., Inc., 798 F.2d 52, 56 (2d Cir. 1986) (excluding 
applicant with “mild mental retardation”); Almonte v. Pierce, 666 F. Supp. 517 (S.D.N.Y. 1987) 
(limiting occupancy to “wheelchair users”). 
 144. HUD NOTICE H 93-36 (Jun. 2, 1993). 
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disabilities.”145  There is a practical import to this sort of segregation.  
Fragmentation in housing and services by diagnosis often result in a denial of 
opportunities to individuals who can benefit from a particular program but are 
rejected because they are people with multiple disabilities, or because their 
disability does not precisely fit the category served in the program.146 
Diagnosis-identified supportive housing implicates other important rights.  
Disability rights laws aim at ending discrimination based on “presumptions, 
patronizing attitudes, fears, and stereotypes about individuals with disabilities. 
Consistent with these standards, public entities are required to ensure that their 
actions are based on facts applicable to individuals,” not group 
characteristics.147  In housing where both units and services are dedicated to 
particular categories of people with disabilities served by particular agencies, 
“every person served represents an income stream” and “people with 
disabilities are reduced to commodities.”148  The concept of equal opportunity 
means that services are provided in the communities where people live so that 
an individual with disabilities has a choice of housing options that are not 
limited by diagnosis or need for support.149  Linking supportive services to 
specific dwelling units limits that choice.  It requires people with disabilities to 
live in segregated places they might not choose, outside of the communities 
with which they identify, and, at least in group home or congregate settings, 
with people they do not select as partners.150  Rights of privacy, autonomy, and 
liberty protect the physical person against intrusion, assuring that an individual 
cannot be forced to receive medical or therapeutic treatment against consent 
and protecting “choices about and control over one’s environment.”151  The 
idea of equal treatment means that people with disabilities are not subjected to 
different or unequal terms and conditions in their occupancy of housing.152  
 
 145. Id. 
 146. HHS, BLUEPRINT FOR CHANGE, supra note 4, at 4, 35, 98; HHS, UNDERSTANDING 
MEDICAID HOME AND COMMUNITY SERVICES, supra note 24, at 104, 145. 
 147. 56 Fed. Reg. 35705 (July 26, 1991) (to be codified at 28 C.F.R. pt. 35). 
 148. Allen, supra note 1, at 503. 
 149. 56 Fed. Reg. 35705; see also 24 C.F.R. § 8.4(b)(3); 28 C.F.R. § 35.130(b)(2) (existence 
of programs solely for people with disabilities cannot serve as basis for curtailing opportunity in 
housing, benefits, and services available to general public). 
 150. Carling & Curtis, supra note 69, at 81; see also Henry Korman, Diane Engster & Bonnie 
M. Milstein, Housing as a Tool of Coercion, in COERCION AND AGGRESSIVE COMMUNITY 
TREATMENT: A NEW FRONTIER IN MENTAL HEALTH LAW 96 (Deborah L. Dennis & John 
Monahan eds., 1996) [hereinafter Korman et al., Housing as a Tool of Coercion] (“community-
based residential treatment programs” represent places where people “live with others not of their 
own choosing. . .”). 
 151. Carling, Housing and Supports for Persons with Mental Illness, supra note 1, at 442; see 
also Greenwood, supra note 4, at 225 (continuum approach to providing services to homeless 
people with disabilities “undermines consumers’ autonomy”). 
 152. 24 C.F.R. § 8.4(b)(1); 28 C.F.R. § 35.130(1). 
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These concepts are undermined where housing is contingent on acquiescence 
to a treatment plan,153 or when the ability to retain possession of the housing is 
not protected by the rights of judicial process afforded to most tenants.154 
Thus, there are compelling arguments against supportive housing programs 
that are segregated by disability, notwithstanding the fact that they are not 
explicitly prohibited by fair housing and civil rights laws.  Nonetheless, the 
challenge remains.  In an atmosphere of scarce housing and service resources, 
is it possible to develop affordable housing opportunities for people with 
disabilities that offer support with community-based living when they want the 
housing, where they want the housing, and on terms and conditions that do not 
result in different treatment? 
VI.  FOCUS ON THE PERSON AND THE PLACE 
History proves that separating people with disabilities from the mainstream 
through segregation in diagnosis-specific settings can result in abuse, 
disempowerment, isolation and neglect.  On the other hand, the earliest 
advocates of disability rights thought that the “Failure to make necessary 
distinctions among the varieties of. . . disability is common alike to popular 
and professional thought, with consequences often destructive to the 
effectiveness of social provisions intended for welfare and rehabilitation.”155  
Martha Minnow, writing about how such “categorical approaches. . . 
undermine commitments to equality,” argued that what matters is not disregard 
of difference, but rather, an emphasis on human relationships in which there is 
a “shared ‘right’ to be included and to participate in society-on terms that may 
 
 153. Korman et al., Housing as a Tool of Coercion, supra note 150, at 96; Michael Allen, 
Separate and Unequal: The Struggle of Tenants with Mental Illness to Maintain Housing, 30 
CLEARINGHOUSE REV. 720, 725-727 (1996). 
 154. See, e.g., Thomas v. Cohen, 453 F.3d 657, 660 (6th Cir. 2006) (occupants may be 
evicted by police from transitional homeless shelter without process of any kind); Cotton v. 
Alexian Bros. Bonaventure House, No. 02-C-7969, 2003 WL 22110501, at *6 (D. Ill. 2003) 
(right to occupy transitional housing for people with HIV/AIDS may be terminated by 
administrative proceeding without judicial process); Padilla v. Padula, 1994 WL 879788, at *1 
(Mass. Super. Ct. 1994) (to same effect, transitional housing for homeless people); Angelo J. 
Melillo Ctr. for Mental Health v. Denise B., 777 N.Y.S.2d 830 (Dist. Ct. 2004) (subsidized 
provider of supportive housing may terminate license to occupy based on refusal to accept 
treatment); Helping Out People Everywhere v. Deich, 589 N.Y.S.2d 744 (S.D.N.Y. 1992) 
(termination of license agreement in emergency shelter); Burke v. Oxford House of Oregon 
Chapter Five, 103 P.3d 1184 (Or. Ct. App. 2004) (resident of halfway house for recovering 
addicts may be evicted with fifteen minutes notice); Sunrise Group Homes, Inc. v. Ferguson, 777 
P.2d 553 (Wash. Ct. App. 1989) (defenses to eviction available to tenants under landlord-tenant 
act not available to resident of congregate living facility for people with developmental 
disabilities). 
 155. Jacobus Tenbroek & Floyd W. Matson, The Disabled and the Law of Welfare, 54 CAL. 
L. REV. 809, 811 (1966). 
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vary for each individual, but that may also entail special rights to make 
inclusion and participation possible.”156  Recognition of difference within a 
context of a human relationship results in practical but crucial legal outcomes, 
requiring, for example, reasonable individualized modifications in policies and 
procedures to ensure “effective and meaningful” access to jobs, education, 
housing and services, removal of structural barriers and construction of 
architecturally accessible facilities and buildings to assure that they are “usable 
to people with disabilities.”157 
Here is the practical dilemma: Supportive services programs are in the 
process of casting off old, discriminatory practices that isolate people with 
disabilities in segregated, institutional settings by category of disability.  High 
levels of poverty, the absence of affordable housing, the needs of people with 
significant disabilities for support in independent living, the history of 
isolation, and the scarcity of funds to undo that history require supportive 
service providers to command housing and service resources following the old 
institutional patterns- by category of disability.  Housing programs hold fast to 
the core fair housing ethic that protected characteristics should be neutral 
factors in the distribution of housing benefits. 
With larger commitments of resources, it might be easier for supportive 
service programs to address the needs of people with disabilities without 
regard to diagnosis, and in a “single point of entry” system where one agency 
administers services for all people with disabilities, instead of multiple 
agencies identified by category of disability.158  Housing programs face similar 
problems of scarce resources and suffer from competing impulses that operate 
to exclude people with disabilities from mainstream assisted housing based on 
the very characteristics that from a fair housing perspective ought to be 
disregarded.  The clash of integrationist ideals from this perspective may be as 
much a conflict between civil rights theory and civil rights practice as anything 
else. 
Perhaps the answer to the question of whether housing programs can truly 
work with supportive service programs lies in the basic insight of the Olmstead 
court that “unjustified institutional isolation of persons with disabilities is a 
form of discrimination . . . .”159  The court’s conclusion “reflects two evident 
judgments” about integration and people with disabilities: 
 
 156. Martha Minnow, When Difference Has Its Home: Group Homes for the Mentally 
Retarded, Equal Protection and Legal Treatment of Difference, 22 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 111, 
112-3, 189 (1987). 
 157. Silverstein, supra note 19, at 1723. 
 158. HHS, UNDERSTANDING MEDICAID HOME AND COMMUNITY SERVICES, supra note 24, 
at 149. 
 159. Olmstead v. L.C., 527 U.S. 581, 596 (1999). 
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First, institutional placement of persons who can handle and benefit from 
community settings perpetuates unwarranted assumptions that persons so 
isolated are incapable or unworthy of participating in community life . . . 
Second, confinement in an institution severely diminishes the everyday life 
activities of individuals, including family relations, social contacts, work 
options, economic independence, educational advancement, and cultural 
enrichment . . . Dissimilar treatment correspondingly exists in this key respect: 
In order to receive needed medical services, persons with mental disabilities 
must, because of those disabilities, relinquish participation in community life 
they could enjoy given reasonable accommodations, while persons without 
mental disabilities can receive the medical services they need without similar 
sacrifice.160 
This observation in Olmstead suggests the core of an answer to the 
dilemma posed by the disconnect between the provision of services on a 
categorical basis and the prohibition in housing programs on serving categories 
of people with disabilities.  A system of housing and supportive services must 
first proceed with respect for and attention to the needs and desires of the 
individual person, not the imperatives of the service provider, nor the category 
of disability served by the provider.  The design of the supportive housing 
must preserve and enhance human relationships, and nurture full and integrated 
participation in the “family relations, social contacts, work options, economic 
independence, educational advancement, and cultural enrichment”161 that are 
the stuff of community life.  Supportive housing cannot result in “dissimilar 
treatment;”162 that is, it should look like the “options available to the general 
public,” rights of occupancy should not be associated with contingencies that 
differ from those available to the general public, and it should not require 
people with disabilities to relinquish choice of location, type of housing, or 
control over treatment decisions.163 
These are principles that shift the focus away from legalistic concerns to 
considerations about ethical boundaries and relationships, imposing “clearer 
responsibility on the consumer for success” while at the same time 
“dramatically changing the role of staff.”164  A successful cultural shift in this 
direction results in housing with features that conform to two integrationist 
frameworks; the framework that emerges from Olmstead and efforts to 
deinstitutionalize systems that serve people with disabilities, and the fair 
 
 160. Id. 
 161. Id. 
 162. Id. 
 163. Carling & Curtis, Implementing Supported Housing, supra note 69, at 91. 
 164. Id.; see also Allen, supra note 153, at 730 (“The promise of full integration of consumers 
into the community depends on equal treatment.  Under such a scenario, access to housing would 
be a function of an individual’s ability to comply with the same rules of tenancy that apply to all 
tenants. . .”). 
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housing framework that avoids distribution of housing resources based on 
protected characteristics.  This approach is outcome oriented.  It is the needs 
and desires expressed by the individual, the features of the housing, and the 
conditions under which the housing is linked to supportive services that matter.  
Within such a cultural shift, it should not matter whether eligibility for 
admission is based on category of disability. 
Operationally, a supportive housing system that marks the cultural shift 
would have the following features: 
• Supportive housing within a larger regime of meaningful choice.  Some 
people with significant disabilities choose structured, less integrated settings 
based on their individual desire for particular kinds and levels of support.165  
However, “people with psychiatric” and other “disabilities generally want the 
same kinds of housing that other citizens want.”166  They want independent, 
affordable apartments or houses, with voluntary access to support.167 
The existence of programs that serve only people with disabilities, or only 
people with particular disabilities cannot be a reason to curtail the availability 
of housing otherwise available to the general public.168  One measure of 
progress towards integration is the achievement of conditions where 
“individuals of similar income levels in the same housing market area have a 
like range of housing choices available to them regardless of their race, color, 
religion, sex, handicap, familial status or national origin.”169  This 
understanding of integration derives from the obligation to affirmatively 
further fair housing under the Fair Housing Act.170  The responsibility to 
further fair housing is one that is also imposed through program statutes and 
agency regulations on virtually every recipient of federal housing funds, 
including recipients of HUD housing subsidies and capital advances, HOME 
funds, and Low-Income Housing Tax Credits.171  The duty is fulfilled, in part, 
 
 165. O’HARA & DAY, supra note 2, at 8, 27; HUD, OFFICE OF POLICY DEVELOPMENT AND 
RESEARCH, PREDICTING STAYING IN OR LEAVING PERMANENT SUPPORTIVE HOUSING THAT 
SERVES HOMELESS PEOPLE WITH SERIOUS MENTAL ILLNESS 75 (2006) [hereinafter HUD, 
STAYING IN OR LEAVING]. 
 166. Carling, Housing and Supports for Persons with Mental Illness, supra note 1, at 442. 
 167. Carling & Curtis, Implementing Supported Housing supra note 69, at 84. 
 168. 24 C.F.R. § 8.4(b)(3); 28 C.F.R. § 35.130(b)(2). 
 169. 24 C.F.R. § 200.610. 
 170. 42 U.S.C. § 3608(d); see also NAACP, Boston Chapter v. Sec’y of Hous. and Urban 
Dev., 817 F.2d 149, 155 (1st Cir. 1987)  (the codification of a duty to further fair housing reflects 
the congressional desire “to fulfill. . . the goal of open, integrated residential housing patterns and 
to prevent the increase of segregation” and “to assist in ending discrimination and segregation to 
the point where the supply of genuinely open housing increases”). 
 171. For a discussion of how the federal obligations devolve to the state and local level, see 
generally Henry Korman, Underwriting for Fair Housing? Achieving Civil Rights Goals in 
Affordable Housing Programs, 14 J. OF AFFORDABLE HOUSING AND COMMUNITY DEV. L. 292 
(2005) [hereinafter Korman, Underwriting for Fair Housing]. 
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through the utilization of “some institutionalized method whereby. . . [the 
agency] has before it the relevant racial and socio-economic information 
necessary for compliance with its duties.”172 
There are ready “institutionalized methods” available to supportive service 
and housing providers through which it is possible to assure that supportive 
housing generally, and supportive housing dedicated to people with one type of 
disability is part of a larger regime of available housing opportunity.  Through 
the intervention of CMS, state supportive services agencies are familiar with 
the responsibility imposed by Olmstead to develop “a comprehensive, 
effectively working plan for placing qualified persons with. . .disabilities in 
less restrictive settings.”173  State housing credit agencies also have the 
obligation to further fair housing.174  They can do so through the Qualified 
Allocation Plans that federal law requires for the distribution of Low-Income 
Housing Tax Credits.175  PHAs receiving public housing subsidies and Section 
8 Housing Choice Voucher funds, and state and local recipients of HUD 
community planning and development funds such as HOME, Community 
Development Block Grants, and McKinney-Vento homeless funding are 
obliged to develop comprehensive plans that include activities to further fair 
housing.176  So far, few Olmstead “planning groups include representatives of 
state housing” agencies.177  Nevertheless, HUD has significant approval, 
monitoring, and enforcement responsibilities in the adoption of jurisdictional 
housing plans.178  That oversight can be exercised to assure that in the 
administration federal housing resources, people with disabilities have access 
to a broad range of housing opportunities, including supportive housing that 
 
 172. Shannon v. U.S. Dep’t. of Hous. and Urban Dev., 436 F.2d 809, 821 (3d Cir. 1970). 
 173. Olmstead v. L.C., 527 U.S. 581, 583; see also ALEXANDRA STEWART, JOEL 
TEITELBAUM & SARA ROSENBAUM, IMPLEMENTING COMMUNITY INTEGRATION: A REVIEW OF 
STATE OLMSTEAD PLANS 3 (Center for Health Care Strategies, Inc., Working Paper No. CA 233-
802) (2002), available at http://www.chcs.org/usr_doc/ImplementingIntegration.pdf (last visited 
Mar. 2, 2007) (describing guidance to state Medicaid directors after Olmstead decision). 
 174. In re Adoption of the 2003 Low Income Hous. Tax Credit Qualified Allocation Plan, 
848 A.2d 1 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 2004); Oti Kaga, Inc. v. S.D. Hous. Dev. Auth., 342 F.3d 
871 (8th Cir. 2003). 
 175. 26 U.S.C. § 42(m). 
 176. See 42 U.S.C. § 1437c-1(d)(15)(2005) (public housing); 42 U.S.C. § 5318(c)(3) (2005) 
(CDBG); 42 U.S.C. § 12705(b)(15) (2005) (HOME). 
 177. NAT’L COUNCIL ON DISABILITY, supra note 49, at 174. 
 178. See, e.g., 24 C.F.R. § 8.56 (2006) (§ 504 investigations, monitoring and compliance); 24 
C.F.R. § 91.215(l) (2006) (local strategic housing plan must describe activities to enhance 
coordination between public and assisted housing providers and private and governmental health, 
mental health, and service agencies); 24 C.F.R. § 91.315(l) (to same effect, state strategic plan); 
24 C.F.R. § 91.315(m) (2006) (state plan must describe strategy to coordinate use of HUD funds 
with LIHTC); 24 C.F.R. § 91.500 (2006) (HUD review and approval of consolidated plans); 24 
C.F.R. § 903.23, § 903.25 (2006) (approval and compliance monitoring of public housing agency 
plans). 
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serves people with categories of disabilities, as well as including other 
affordable housing available to the general public. 
• Necessity and efficacy in the link between housing and supportive 
services.  It is worth stating once again the civil rights conditions under which 
separate housing for people with disabilities is permissible: segregated settings 
are appropriate only when necessary to provide “qualified individuals with 
[disabilities] with housing aid, benefits, or services that are as effective as those 
provided to others.”179  Research indicates that “the effectiveness of 
transitional halfway houses in reducing recidivism, improving economic self-
sufficiency, and improving community adjustment [is] ‘highly suspect.’”180  
The relative lack of efficacy in bundled housing for people with disabilities is 
most evident in studies that compare HUD’s Continuum of Care approach to 
providing services to chronically homeless people with an alternative approach 
known as Housing First. 
The “Continuum of Care model graduates” homeless individuals “through 
a series of stages,” including “emergency shelter, transitional housing, and then 
finally to supportive and/or permanent housing, but only if the individual 
complies with prescribed treatment through ‘supportive services’. . .Failure to 
comply at any level or a relapse into using alcohol or drugs may incur a return 
to a more restrictive environment.”181  In contrast, the “Housing First 
program’s first priority is to stabilize people in the short-term and help them 
get housed immediately.”182  The program “provides a [subsidized] apartment 
without any prerequisites for psychiatric treatment or sobriety.  In addition to 
an apartment, consumers are offered treatment by the program’s Assertive 
Community Treatment (ACT) team.”183  Comparing outcomes for participants 
in Continuum of Care programs with those of participants in a Housing First 
program, one study found that Housing First “participants experienced a 
decrease in psychiatric symptoms . . . and smaller proportions of time 
homeless” even though the participants also “reported lower service 
utilization.”184 
While some Housing First programs serve all homeless families as the 
target population, others are aimed exclusively at “those with mental health 
 
 179. 24 C.F.R. § 8. 4(b)(1)(iv); 28 C.F.R. § 35.130(b)(1)(iv) (emphasis added). 
 180. Carling, Housing and Supports for Persons with Mental Illness, supra note 1, at 441. 
 181. Greenwood et al., supra note 4, at 224. 
 182. NAT’L ALLIANCE TO END HOMELESSNESS, INC., HOUSING FIRST FOR FAMILIES: 
RESEARCH TO SUPPORT THE DEVELOPMENT OF A HOUSING FIRST FOR FAMILIES TRAINING 
CURRICULUM 3 (2004), available at http://www.endhomelessness.org/pub/HousingFirst 
Research.pdf (last visited Mar. 3, 2007). 
 183. Sam Tsemberis, Leyla Gulcur & Maria Nakae, Housing First, Consumer Choice, and 
Harm Reduction for Homeless Individuals with a Dual Diagnosis, 94 AMERICAN J. OF PUB. 
HEALTH 651, 657 (2004). 
 184. Greenwood et al., supra note 4, at 224-225. 
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and substance use issues.”185  Nevertheless, Housing First qualifies as a 
supportive housing program that is consistent with civil rights principles for at 
least three reasons.  The characteristics of the housing are the same as the sort 
of housing available to the general public.  Supportive services are voluntary.  
Finally, when participation is limited to people within a category of disability, 
that limitation is effective in reducing barriers to stable housing for people 
whose disabilities might otherwise prevent equal access. 
• Matching people to services; not disabilities to units.  Disability 
discrimination laws require that decisions about the distribution of housing and 
services must be “based on facts applicable to individuals and not on 
presumptions as to what a class of individuals with disabilities can or cannot 
do.”186  In practical terms, this principle means that applicants for supportive 
housing qualify for admission not because of their relationship to a diagnosis-
identified service provider, but instead because they can benefit from the 
services offered in connection with the housing.  They should not be refused 
admission because they are not clients of the service agency at the time of 
application and selection.  This approach is the one taken in the 1997 HOME 
program guidance.187  A related concept is that people with multiple 
disabilities must not be excluded because they have some other disability in 
combination with the disability for which the services are primarily 
designed.188 
• Services are separate from housing.  The Housing First model in which 
services are voluntary and follow the person to their home is also responsive to 
the ideas of privacy and autonomy.  It is based on the research finding that 
. . .a lack of personal control and choice, rather than too much of it is 
associated with the experience of psychiatric symptoms.  Models that make 
housing contingent on relinquishment of control over daily living practices and 
preferences actually erode an important tool for coping with the very 
circumstances they are intended to redress.  Programs that are designed to 
restore choice and enhance perceptions of personal control may actually be 
more successful in the reduction of psychiatric symptoms. . . .189 
This approach understands that “housing needs are separate from the needs 
for treatment.”  It aims for “a highly individualized set of service relationships 
with individual consumers living in various housing situations.”  It means that 
 
 185. NAT’L ALLIANCE TO END HOMELESSNESS, INC., supra note 182, at 23. 
 186. 56 Fed. Reg. 35693, 35703 (Jul. 26, 1991) (promulgating ADA Title II rules) (emphasis 
added). 
 187. See HOMEfires, supra note 95. 
 188. Chapa v. Adams, 168 F.3d 1036, 1039 (7th Cir. 1999); see also U.S. DEPARTMENT OF 
JUSTICE, AMERICANS WITH DISABILITIES ACT TITLE III TECHNICAL ASSISTANCE MANUAL 4-
2200 (person with blindness may not be excluded from office of cancer specialist on account of 
visual impairment) (1993). 
 189. Greenwood et al., supra note 4, at 234 (emphasis in original). 
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services are voluntary, and that they are “flexible, portable,” and available “on 
demand.”190 
• Rights of occupancy are not diminished.  Closely associated with the 
concept that services should be voluntary is the idea that people with 
disabilities should not be subjected to different terms and conditions and lesser 
privileges of occupancy simply because their housing is also a place where 
they might receive services.191  Housing linked to services often violates this 
principle by diminishing the possessory rights of program participants to the 
units they occupy through the use of license agreements that allow for 
summary termination of tenancy with little or no procedural protections.192  
Using mainstream housing resources in supportive housing protect these rights 
simply because rules in the HOME, Project-Based Voucher, LIHTC, and 
similar programs require the use of leases, guard against eviction except for 
good cause, and forbid “summary eviction,” including summary eviction 
without process for “failure to comply with program requirements.”193  In any 
case, it ought to be a principle of supportive housing that the housing is 
permanent, and continued occupancy is based on standard landlord-tenant law, 
 
 190. Carling & Curtis, Implementing Supported Housing, supra note 69, at 81.  There is a 
significant body of law addressing the civil rights circumstances under which treatment can be 
administered without consent to people found to be a danger to themselves or others, people who 
lack capacity to make treatment decisions, and even people simply deemed by service providers 
as individuals in need of aggressive treatment.  See, e.g., Bruce J. Winick, Coercion and Mental 
Health Treatment, 74 DENVER U. L. REV. 1145 (1997).  These issues overlap with discussions 
about the voluntary nature of supportive services in housing.  A full treatment of how the two 
topics interact is beyond the scope of this paper.  For a collection of articles discussing such 
matters, see COERCION AND AGGRESSIVE COMMUNITY TREATMENT: A NEW FRONTIER IN 
MENTAL HEALTH LAW (Deborah L. Dennis and John Monahan eds., 1996). 
 191. 24 C.F.R. § 8.4(b)(1) (2006); 28 C.F.R. § 35.130(b)(1) (2006); see also Olmstead. V. 
L.C., 527 U.S. 581, 601  (1999) (unjustified isolation is discrimination because “persons with 
mental disabilities must, because of those disabilities, relinquish participation in community life 
they could enjoy given reasonable accommodations, while persons without mental disabilities can 
receive the medical services they need without similar sacrifice”). 
 192. See supra note 154. 
 193. I.R.S. Priv. Ltr. Rul. 98-11-020 (Dec. 3, 1997) (no summary eviction in tax credit 
housing); see also 24 C.F.R. § 92.253(c) (2006) (HOME program requires leases; no termination 
of tenancy without good cause or judicial process); id. at § 983.256 (lease in Project-Based 
Voucher program); id. at § 983.257 (good cause eviction, Project-Based Vouchers); Rev. Rul. 
2004-82, 2004-350 I.R.B. (good cause evictions in LIHTC program); ANTHONY S. FREEDMAN, 
NATIONAL COUNCIL OF STATE HOUSING CREDIT AGENCIES, ESSENTIAL GUIDE TO HOUSING 
CREDIT COMPLIANCE: A MANUAL TO ASSIST HOUSING CREDIT PROPERTY OWNERS, 
MANAGERS AND STATE AGENCIES IN UNDERSTANDING AND MEETING COMPLIANCE 
RESPONSIBILITIES 2-12, 5-13 (1997) (based on the legislative history, conventional practice for 
tax credit units requires an initial lease of no less than six months, with month-to-month rental 
agreements thereafter). 
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instead of an individual’s qualifications as a participant in a program of 
supportive services.194 
• Site selection, concentration, and design.  Civil rights-related program 
requirements already impose some site selection and design criteria intended to 
promote fair housing goals.  For example, it is common knowledge that most 
housing developed with state and federal funds must be sited, designed, and 
constructed in a manner consistent with uniform architectural standards that 
make them “usable and accessible” to people with mobility and sensory 
impairments.195  Most mainstream housing programs prohibit the use of funds 
for medical and institutional facilities.196  Criteria used by HUD in the 
competitive selection process for awarding Section 811 funds for the 
development of housing and supportive services for people with disabilities 
impose project size limits for independent living projects and group homes that 
are intended to avoid high concentrations of people with disabilities in one 
project, or on one site.197 Rating factor points are awarded for project design 
and siting features that are shown to “meet the individual needs of the residents 
and will facilitate their integration into the surrounding community and 
promote their ability to live as independently as possible.”198 
In the context of race discrimination, it is recognized that design, choice of 
location, and the density and configuration of housing result in significant fair 
housing consequences.  So, for example, high-rise elevator buildings for 
families with children are usually not eligible for HUD funding because of 
concerns about density.199  HUD civil rights-related program requirements 
generally forbid site selection in areas with high concentrations of poverty and 
racial segregation, and require PHAs to adopt admissions practices that serve 
to deconcentrate poverty.200  Assisted housing must also “promote greater 
 
 194. O’HARA & DAY, supra note 2, at 8; Allen, supra note 153, at 730. 
 195. 24 C.F.R. § 8.4(b)(5), §8.20, et seq. (2006) (Section 504 site selection and accessibility 
requirements); 28 C.F.R. § 35.150, et seq. (2006) (ADA Title II requirements); 28 C.F.R. § 
36.211 (2006) (ADA Title III); see also 42 U.S.C. § 3604(f)(3)(C) (2006) (Title VIII accessibility 
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 196. 24 C.F.R. § 92.2 (HOME definition of “housing” excludes nursing facilities); 24 C.F.R. 
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section 42”). 
 197. 72 Fed. Reg. 11683, 11725 (Mar. 13, 2007). 
 198. 72 Fed. Reg. 11729. 
 199. See 42 U.S.C. § 1437d(a) (2006) (public housing); § 1437f(c)(1) (2006) (Section 8). 
 200. See 24 C.F.R. § 983.57 (2006) (standards for deconcentration of poverty and site and 
neighborhood standards in Project-Based Housing Choice Voucher program); 24 C.F.R. § 903.2 
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choice of housing opportunities,” and be accessible to amenities like 
“educational, commercial, and health facilities,” public transportation and 
employment opportunities.201 
Site and neighborhood standards that focus on poverty and race also apply 
to the HUD housing programs that provide sources of funds for supportive 
housing.202  “Housing environmental factors, including extent of crimes and 
illicit drug activities in the building and at the neighborhood level” often 
influence the decision of homeless people with disabilities to stay in or leave 
supportive housing because of the effect such conditions have on “their chance 
of staying sober. . . and their capacity for managing stress, and consequently, 
their opportunity for staying in permanent housing.”203 
Supportive housing can benefit from lessons learned in the race context 
with more robust standards aimed at reducing isolation, preventing 
segregation, and avoiding differential treatment.  Units scattered within a 
larger housing development, integrated by income and occupied by people 
with and without disabilities are preferred over facilities serving only people 
with disabilities.204  High density housing with a large number of units in one 
facility serving only one category of disability must be avoided, except in the 
rare case where aggregating services and housing in this manner is necessary 
to achieve integration for people with very significant disabilities.205  Housing 
should be built on sites that are part of vibrant communities, located near 
educational, commercial, and health facilities, public transportation and 
employment opportunities, away from crime, poverty, drugs, and racial 
segregation.  Units should be designed as apartments and homes, not as beds in 
a congregate facility.  Indeed, the highest and best integrative model for 
supportive housing may be the one that people without disabilities expect will 
apply to their own life situations: “scattered-site housing models with mobile 
supports which may, or may not, be provided in the person’s home.”206 
•  Race and ethnicity.  Discrimination and segregation based on race and 
ethnicity have long plagued public and assisted housing programs, some of it 
caused by histories of deliberate segregation and deprivation of housing 
opportunity for people of color, and some of it the result of benign but 
 
(2006) (deconcentration of poverty in public housing); 24 C.F.R. § 941.202 (2006) (site and 
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 202. See, e.g., 24 C.F.R. § 92.202 (2006) (HOME program); 24 C.F.R. § 891.125 (2006) 
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 204. 24 C.F.R. § 100.70(c)(4). 
 205. O’HARA & DAY, supra note 2, at 10-11. 
 206. Id. at 8. 
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persistent neglect of racial considerations.207  Questions of racial 
discrimination are largely absent from discussions of supportive housing 
programs.  Nevertheless, there is growing evidence that race, ethnic 
background, and culture all play a role in preventing people of color and 
people whose first language is not English from gaining access to health care 
and services.  There is a higher prevalence of poverty and disability among 
households of color than among white households.208  There is also a 
substantially higher rate of poverty among disabled families of color compared 
to white disabled households.209  Government studies document “the existence 
of striking disparities for minorities in mental health services. . . [r]acial and 
ethnic minorities have less access to mental health services than do whites. . . 
[t]hey are less likely to receive needed care. . . [w]hen they receive care, it is 
more likely to be poor in quality.”210  At least one study observed that 
characteristics “such as race or ethnicity, may influence the propensity to use” 
Medicaid HCBS waiver services.211  As a result, some states serving high 
numbers of people of color with disabilities elect against community-based 
services and instead continue to limit choice to institutional forms of long term 
care.212 
Of course, it is Olmstead, the ADA, and Section 504 that provide the civil 
rights impetus for the new paradigm that is supportive housing.  These are civil 
rights authorities that guard against disability discrimination, not 
discrimination based on race or ethnicity.  However, the Olmstead court’s 
conclusion that institutional isolation is a form of disability discrimination is 
directly connected to antecedent cases in which it was understood that 
stigmatizing injury often caused by racial discrimination “is one of the most 
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serious consequences of discriminatory government action.”213  The 
obligations to further fair housing, to affirmatively market to racial and ethnic 
minorities, and to refrain from racial discrimination embedded in the Fair 
Housing Act and related laws apply with full force to supportive housing.  It is 
incumbent on supportive housing providers to attend to these issues. 
VII.  TOWARD A NEWER PARADIGM 
The impediment to developing supportive housing represented by the 
conflict between service programs dedicated to categories of people with 
disabilities and housing programs forbidding such standards is a false 
contradiction.  For affordable housing and supportive services programs alike, 
the “‘new paradigm’ of disability” is focused on “eliminating the attitudinal 
and institutional barriers that preclude persons with disabilities from 
participating fully in society’s mainstream.”214  The issues of scarcity, poverty, 
and disability that make it necessary for people with disabilities to command 
the availability of housing and service resources are not about to vanish, and 
will require setting aside housing specifically for people with disabilities for 
the foreseeable future.  Those issues and the imperatives of Olmstead are likely 
to force the continued practice of dedicating resources to people with specific 
disabilities.  If supportive housing is located within a larger fabric of 
opportunity for people with disabilities in the same housing that is available to 
the general public, if the features of supportive housing resemble the 
apartments, homes, and rights of tenancy also available to the general public, 
and if access to and utilization of services is a function of individual needs, 
desires, and choice, then it should not matter whether eligibility for housing is 
identified by category of disability. 
Systems of supportive services are in fact moving toward models that do 
not restrict eligibility based on category of disability, connection to 
institutions, or control of services by providers.  Recent amendments to the 
Medicaid statute allow states to provide home and community-based services 
to elders and people with disabilities without need for a federal waiver, and 
without the necessity of proving that the provision of HCBS would be less 
costly than institutional care.  Under the new law, people with disabilities 
would qualify for services based on an individualized assessment of need; 
services would be based on an individualized care plan, and states would have 
the option to provide “self-directed services” where the “services for the 
individual. . .are planned and purchased under the direction and control” of the 
participant.215  The same legislation creates a Medicaid demonstration program 
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in which individuals who would otherwise face institutionalization receive 
Medicaid-funded services “in the appropriate settings of their choice, including 
costs to transition from institutional settings to a qualified residence,” such as a 
home or apartment, or a “community-based residential setting, in which no 
more than four unrelated persons reside.”216 
Affordable housing programs may also be moving toward more flexible 
standards that permit different models of supportive housing.  The recent 
amendments to HUD’s Project-Based Housing Choice Voucher regulations 
reflect this trend.  Services may be provided at the site of the housing, or off-
site, independent of the dwelling units.  The new rules match people to services 
based on individual need by permitting supportive housing providers to offer 
selection preferences “to disabled families who need services offered at a 
particular project.”217  The rules work to preserve autonomy by mandating that 
“[d]isabled residents shall not be required to accept the particular services 
offered at the project.”218  They honor the concept of separate housing only 
when needed to achieve civil rights goals by limiting segregated settings to 
those circumstances where there is no other means to meet the housing needs 
of people with significant disabilities.219  Perhaps the most important feature of 
the Project-Based Voucher program from a civil rights standpoint is the central 
role of individual choice and housing opportunity embedded in the program.  
After one year of occupancy in a project-based development, participants can 
request and receive a portable, tenant-based voucher in exchange for the 
project-based assistance.  Once issued, the tenant-based voucher enables a 
participant to leave the supportive housing environment and rent a unit of their 
choosing in the private market.220 
Even with these new standards of flexibility, the gap between housing 
programs and service programs is not yet completely closed.  The Project-
Based Voucher rule retains the prohibition on selection preferences for people 
with a category of disability.221  The recent changes to the Medicaid statute 
still permit supportive service providers to limit access to community-based 
services to target populations based on type of disability.222  Under these 
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circumstances, housing opportunities for people with disabilities, especially the 
people with significant disabilities that stand to benefit from Olmstead, will 
depend on the ability of people with disabilities to demand, and the 
concomitant ability of service and housing providers to respond by developing 
supportive housing with operational hallmarks that further civil rights in order 
to achieve true integration.  
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